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Abstract
The label “Keynes-Negishi equilibria” is attached here to equilibria in a monetary
economy with imperfectly competitive product and labor markets where business
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“In economic science general equilibrium theory plays a role similar to that played in
university curricula by mathematics and language studies. It must certainly have its own
discipline (i.e. the demonstration of the consistency of its theoretical structure), but at
the same time it should also offer services to other branches of study. To tell the story of
general equilibrium theory, therefore, one must talk of its applications as well as of its pure
theory.”
Takashi Negishi (1972, p. vii)
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
In two papers and a book, Takashi Negishi (1974, 1976, 1979) has developed “micro-
foundations for Keynesian macroeconomics.” He writes (1979, p. 2): “The Keynesian eco-
nomic system is a fixprice system in the sense of Hicks (1974) that prices are independent
of demand and supply. One should not be satisfied, however, merely by this statement.
One has to explain why prices (and wages) are independent of demand and supply.”
Negishi’s own explanation rests on kinks in the demand functions perceived by the
agents. The concept of “perceived demand functions” had been introduced in Negishi
(1961)1 and developed further in Negishi (1972). It provides a simpler and more realistic
foundation for general equilibrium modeling of monopolistic or imperfect competition than
objective demand functions.2 It is applicable both to the situation of a firm concerned with
assessing the implications of alternative prices for output demand; and to the situation of
a union concerned with assessing the implications of alternative wages for labor demand.
In both cases, the perceived demand curves summarize the information available to the
agent. Typically, however, that information may be limited, implying uncertainty about
market reactions; and it may suggest different market reactions for price decreases versus
price increases. This last feature is conducive to a kink in the perceived demand curve
at the current output point. It was justified in Sweezy (1939) by asymmetrical reactions
of competitors, in Stiglitz (1984) by asymmetrical search behavior of consumers. Dre`ze
(1979) notes that uncertainty about demand elasticity leads risk-averse firms to behave as
if they faced a kinky demand curve.
It was Negishi’s original “perception” that kinky perceived demand curves could explain
the price-wage stickiness associated with Keynesian equilibria.3 That idea is treated most
1At that time, Negishi was still a graduate student!
2Cf. Negishi (1972, p. 107) or Dehez et al. (2003, p. 220).
3More recently, that theme has been revived by Woodford (1991). Note however that Woodford (2003)
ignores it altogether.
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fully in his 1979 book (hereafter “N79”), which includes a number of interesting side-
developments. The hurried reader will find the gist of the argument in Chapter 7, entitled
“Kinked demand curves and Keynesian equilibrium” (pp. 87–97).
That chapter analyzes a simplified economy with two “industries” supplying respec-
tively one consumer good and one investment good. Each industry is modeled through a
representative firm, with a short-run neo-classical production function relating output to
uni-dimensional labor input. A fixed share of profits is saved, and savings should match
an exogenous level of real investment demand. Labor is supplied by identical consumers-
workers. Both the representative firms and the representative worker are endowed with
asymmetrical perceived price elasticities; these are assumed equal to zero in the case of a
decrease in goods or labor supply, to a finite strictly negative constant in the case of an
increase. Assuming that the price elasticities relevant to supply increases are greater than
unity in absolute value, Negishi proves existence of a Keynesian equilibrium,4 and con-
cludes on the unexpected corollary that “real wages can be lower at an underemployment
equilibrium than at the full employment equilibrium” (N79, p. 97).
1.2 Outline and summary
The purpose of this paper is to prove (27 years later!) existence of a Keynes-Negishi equi-
librium for a model and under assumptions of the kind used in modern general equilibrium
theory. This purpose is clearly in the spirit of Negishi (1961, 1972). It calls for multi-
ple goods or types of labor, and for heterogeneous agents. Negishi’s program adds two
requirements: monetary exchange and organized labor.
The treatment of these two topics is not found in Chapter 7 of N79; instead, these
topics receive specific attention in separate chapters.5 We return in Section 7 below to the
methodological premises of these chapters. Suffice it to record here that: (i) we adhere
to the “rule of the game” (N79, p. 28) that “all exchanges are assumed to be monetary
in the sense of Clower (1967)”; that is, money is demanded for transaction purposes, as
exemplified by the “cash-in-advance” model; (ii) we concur that “a trade union is not
a monopolistic firm but an association of heterogeneous workers” (N79, p. 7). Our own
treatment of these two topics (in Sections 4 and 5) aims again at generality.
This paper rests on the concept of “pricing rules” introduced in the seminal paper by
Dierker et al. (1985). A pricing rule is a correspondence associating with every technolog-
ically efficient production plan for a firm the set of price vectors at which the firm would
supply that production. An application of that concept to “imperfect competition a` la
4The equilibrium is such that exogenous shocks to aggregate demand (to investment, in Negishi’s model)
result in quantity adjustments at unchanged prices.
5Cf. Chapter 10, “Vulnerability to inflation”; and Chapter 17, “Employment, wages and trade unions”.
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Negishi” is developed in Dehez et al. (2003), starting from the pioneering formulation in
Negishi (1961, 1972). The pricing rule in Dehez et al., reviewed in Section 2 below, is
derived from the conditions for profit maximization under a perceived demand function
congruent with given market signals (an allocation and a price vector). Here, we derive
(in Section 3) the pricing rule from compatibility with profit maximization at a kink of
a perceived demand function, thus allowing demand elasticities to differ as between price
hikes and price cuts. We derive the set of inequalities which is necessary and sufficient for
neither price increases nor price cuts to entail higher profits, at a technologically efficient
production plan, given an allocation and market prices. From these we derive simpler in-
equalities that lead to sufficient conditions. Our pricing rule is the correspondence defined
by the latter inequalities. The formulation is quite general and applicable to perfectly as
well as imperfectly competitive firms, whose demand perceptions may or may not display
kinks. We introduce kinky perceived demand functions in Section 3, after introducing the
model in Section 2.
Section 4 brings in unions, i.e. “associations of heterogeneous workers.” The primitives
of the economy are enlarged with a set of unions, each defined by its membership and
by the set of labor markets on which it sets wages. Each union is endowed with labor
demand perceptions on the markets where it sets wages, and these perceptions typically
entail kinks.
The objective of the union has been the subject of a vast literature, surveyed in Negishi
(1979), Oswald (1985), or Farber (1986). Our formulation, aiming at generality with
consistency, assumes that unions act in the interest of their heterogeneous members. More
precisely, we assume that wages set by a union are Pareto efficient from the viewpoint of the
given set of members. Interestingly, this guiding principle is analogous to that advocated
in some literature on decision criteria for business firms operating in an incomplete markets
framework. Starting with Dre`ze (1974),6 it has been recognized that a firm aiming at Pareto
efficiency from the viewpoint of the shareholders should evaluate profits (not fully priced on
the incomplete markets) at shadow prices defined as weighted averages of the corresponding
shadow prices of shareholders, with weights given by shareholdings. A comparable property
holds for wage-setting unions, which should attach to their wage-unemployment trade-off
a shadow price (reservation wage) averaging those of the union’s members.
It is shown in Section 4 that unions are led by this criterion to adopt pricing rules
formally analogous to those of imperfectly competitive firms. The substantive difference
lies in the objectives (Pareto efficiency versus profit maximization).7
Section 5 brings in money. The simplest way to do so, which we borrow from Dre`ze and
6See, e.g., Magill and Quinzii (1996, Chapter 6).
7Under incomplete markets, the difference in objectives disappears if firms adopt the Dre`ze criterion.
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Polemarchakis (1999, 2001a, 2001b), is to introduce non-interest bearing “inside” money,8
produced at no cost by a (central) bank. The bank prints money as demanded by the
agents (households and firms), and lends it against promises to reimburse with interest.
“Inside” money means that the bank keeps balanced accounts: the quantity of money
outstanding is equal to the sum of claims on the agents held by the bank. The bank sets
nominal interest rates: this is the “pricing rule” of the bank, here treated as a primitive.
The interest collected by the bank corresponds to bank profits, which are distributed to
agents as dividends. “Cash-in-advance” means that the agents (households and firms)
face different net prices for purchases (paid for at the time of transaction) and for sales
(whose proceeds accrue at the end of period). There thus exist kinks in the budget or profit
equations, also making the presence of kinks ubiquitous in the present paper.
Sections 3-5 thus cover with much generality the existence part of Negishi’s program,
culminating in the general result of Section 6. Some applications and methodological issues
are briefly discussed in the concluding Section 7.
1.3 Technical guideline
This paper grew out of the realization (in July 2006!) that scattered results on general
equilibrium with imperfect competition a` la Negishi, with firms implementing Pareto effi-
ciency for their shareholders, or with inside money could be: (i) extended to kinky demand
perceptions; and (ii) combined in an integrated framework.9 Both achievements are of in-
dependent interest in their own rights. Not surprisingly, a host of technical hurdles sprang
up in the course of implementing that program. In order to guide readers through these
hurdles, we start each of the innovative Sections 3, 4, and 5 with an elementary example (al-
ready introduced in Section 2.4), which illustrates the extensions to the pricing rules. The
technical developments themselves are then presented in lemmas, proved in the Appendix.
Because the paper by Dehez et al. (2003) provided our starting point, we were led to
rely on the technical tool of pricing rules - inescapable there to deal with non-convexities
in production. Each of the three innovative Sections 3, 4, and 5 is devoted essentially
to develop pricing rules (of firms and/or unions) for the extended frameworks. Readers
are reminded (repeatedly!) that pricing rules themselves are a tool of the theorist, not a
behavioral characterization of the agents.
8This specification is thus sharply different from the models of “outside” money, discussed for instance
in Negishi (1972, Chapter 16).
9The realization was triggered by our own involvement in the earlier work in the three areas at stake,
in particular Dehez et al. (2003) for Section 3, Dre`ze (1974) for Section 4, and Dre`ze and Polemarchakis
(2001b) for Section 5. This also resulted in an excessive inclination towards self-citations, for which we
sollicit the readers’ indulgence.
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2 An elementary real model
2.1 Primitives
We shall throughout deal with a standard abstract economy, whose real side consists of:10
(a) A commodity space RL, with coordinates (commodities) indexed by l ∈ L.11
(b) A set of J firms indexed by j ∈ J , each defined by a production set Y j ⊂ RL (closed,
convex) satisfying Y j +RL− ⊂ Y j (free disposal) and Y j ∩RL+ = {0} (absence of free
production, possibility of inaction).
(c) A set of H households indexed by h ∈ H; each household is defined by the tuple
(Xh,h, eh, θh). The tuple consists of a consumption set Xh ⊂ RL (closed, convex,
bounded from below), a preference preordening h on Xh (complete, continuous,
convex, and weakly monotone), a vector of initial endowments eh for which there
exists xh ∈ Xh such that xh  eh, and a vector of ownership fractions θh = (θhj)j∈J
in the J firms, 0 ≤ θhj ≤ 1, where for each j, ∑h θhj = 1.12
A consumption plan for household h is xh ∈ Xh. A production plan for firm j is yj ∈ Y j.
An allocation a is a tuple
(x, y) = ((xh)h∈H, (yj)j∈J ) ∈
∏
h∈H
Xh ×
∏
j∈J
Y j.
The allocation a is feasible if it satisfies∑
h∈H
xh ≤
∑
h∈H
eh +
∑
j∈J
yj.
The set A denotes the set of feasible allocations. The aggregate production set is Y =∑
j∈J Y
j. We further assume the following.
(A.1) The production process is irreversible, Y ∩ −Y = {0}.
This assumption implies that the set of feasible allocations A is bounded.
(A.2) For each commodity l′ ∈ L, there exists a household h ∈ H whose preferences are
strictly monotonic with respect to xhl′ , i.e., for every x
h ∈ Xh, there exists xˆh ∈ Xh
such that xˆhl′ > x
h
l′ , xˆ
h
l = x
h
l for all l ∈ L \ {l′}, and xˆh h xh.
The foregoing is assumed throughout without reminder.
10Our real economy in this section is the same as in Dehez et al. (2003) - hereafter DDS. We refer the
reader to that paper for proofs of the results mentioned in this section.
11In Sections 5 and 6, treating time and uncertainty explicitly, the commodity space will be RLN , with
coordinates (commodities at date events) indexed by lst ∈ L ×N .
12A vector v is a column vector; its transpose v> is a row vector. Vector inequalities are ≥, >,  .
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2.2 Pricing rules
To define “pricing rules” we need some more notation. Write ∂Y j := {yj ∈ Y j |6∃ yˆj ∈
Y j, yˆj  yj} for the “weakly efficient boundary” of the production set Y j; ι> :=
(1, . . . , 1) ∈ RL for the unit vector in RL; ∆L = ∆ := {v ∈ RL+ | ι>v = 1} for the
unit simplex in RL; SL = S := {v ∈ RL | ι>v = 1} for the hyperplane in RL containing ∆;
p ∈ RL for a price vector.
Definition 2.1 A pricing rule for firm j is a correspondence ϕj : ∂Y j × A × ∆ → S
that, given the market data (a¯, p¯), assigns to each production plan yj ∈ ∂Y j a set of prices
ϕj(yj; a¯, p¯) ∈ S.
A pricing rule is a correspondence associating with every technologically efficient produc-
tion plan for a firm the set of price vectors at which the firm would be willing to supply
that production bundle. To give content to that abstract definition, consider first a firm
endowed with a smooth convex technology and maximizing profits at given prices. Its equi-
librium condition (“prices equal marginal costs” in the simplest cases) requires that prices
correspond, for any point yj ∈ ∂Y j, to the vector normal to Y j at yj - say N j(yj); indeed,
by definition of the normal vector, pj ∈ N j(yj) implies pj>yj ≥ pj> yˆj for all yˆj ∈ Y j. If
the production set is convex, but not smooth, the normal cone to yj at Y j collects all the
vectors pj for which pj
>
yj ≥ pj> yˆj, ∀yˆj ∈ Y j; it may still be denoted N j(yj). In this simple
case, the pricing rule is independent of market data and given by13
ϕj(yj) = {pj ∈ S | pj ∈ N j(yj)}.
By definition, N j(yj) is a cone with vertex {0}. It defines relative prices. The restriction
“pj ∈ S” is one convenient normalization among many. For a set Y j with free disposal,
the normal cone at yj ∈ ∂Y j is a collection of non-negative vectors.
2.3 Equilibrium under pricing rules
The more interesting application based upon imperfect competition is developed in Sec-
tion 2.4. Before turning to that, it is appropriate to complete the abstract theory of
equilibrium under pricing rules.
Definition 2.2 An equilibrium under pricing rules consists of an allocation a¯ ∈ R(H+J)L
and a price vector p¯ ∈ ∆ such that:
13This way of describing competitive behavior is one escape from the contradiction between price setting
and competition advanced in Arrow (1959).
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(E.1) For each h, x¯h is h-maximal in the budget set Bh(a¯, p¯) = {xh ∈ Xh | p¯>xh ≤
p¯>eh +
∑
j θ
hj p¯>y¯j}.
(E.2) For each j, p¯ ∈ ϕj(y¯j; a¯, p¯).
(E.3)
∑
h∈H x¯
h =
∑
h∈H e
h +
∑
j∈J y¯
j.
Thus, the standard definition is modified: profit maximization by firms is replaced by the
condition that market prices belong to the pricing rule of every firm. In the special case
where ϕj(yj; a¯, p¯) ≡ N j(yj), Definition 2.2 corresponds to the definition of competitive
equilibrium.
Existence requires that pricing rules be “well-behaved.” Not surprisingly, the following
conditions emerge, j ∈ J :
(P.1) The correspondence ϕj is upper hemi-continuous and compact, convex, and non-
empty valued at (yj; a¯, p¯).
(P.2) For all pj ∈ ϕj(yj; a¯, p¯), pj>yj ≥ 0.
The first postulate is required to invoke Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem. The second is
crucial in proving that a fixed point is an equilibrium, and is also needed to guarantee
non-negative property incomes.14
Theorem 2.3 For the economy of Section 2.1, under P.1 and P.2, there exists an equilib-
rium with pricing rules.
2.4 Equilibrium under imperfect competition a` la Negishi
A more interesting application deals with imperfect competition. The starting point comes
from Negishi (1961, 1972), who considers “perceived inverse demand functions” defined,
at market signals (a¯, p¯), by
pij(yj; a¯, p¯) = p¯+Hj(a¯, p¯)(yj − y¯j), (2.1)
with Hj(a¯, p¯) a negative semi-definite (NSD) matrix. In words: the right-hand side of (2.1)
gives the prices at which the firm expects to be able to trade the quantities yj, when the
market data are (a¯, p¯). We make the following assumptions.
(A.3) For each j ∈ J , the mapping (a¯, p¯)→ Hj(a¯, p¯) is continuous, and the matrixHj(a¯, p¯)
is NSD for (a¯, p¯) ∈ A×∆.
14Since {0} ∈ Y j , (P.2) is always satisfied when ϕj(yj ; a¯, p¯) = N j(yj).
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(A.4) For each j ∈ J , the matrix Hj(a¯, p¯)> owns at least one row with zero entries,
identically in (a¯, p¯).15
The associated profits are
yj
>
(p¯−Hj(a¯, p¯)y¯j) + yj>Hj(a¯, p¯)yj.
In the real (i.e. non-monetary) economy, it is natural to take p¯ ∈ ∆, and to impose that
equations (2.1) be homogeneous of degree 1 in the overall price level ι>p¯; that is, for p¯ ∈ ∆
and for all k > 0:
pij(yj; a¯, kp¯) = kp¯+ kHj(a¯, p¯)(yj − y¯j).
We will make such an assumption in Section 6, when we study the indeterminacy and
neutrality of the overall price level in a monetary economy.
In equilibrium, the producer will choose a production bundle consistent with the market
data, yj = y¯j. First-order conditions (FOC) for maximal profits at y¯j require the existence
of a vector qj in the normal cone N j(y¯j) such that16 17
p¯+Hj(a¯, p¯)>y¯j − qj = 0. (2.2)
Example 2.4 In a typical illustration, the firm has competitive demand perceptions for
most commodities, inducing zeros in the corresponding rows and columns of the matrix H.
If the price of commodity l were unaffected by yj, then row l of the matrix Hj(a¯, p¯) has
zero entries; if the level of yjl does not affect prices, then column l of the matrix H
j(a¯, p¯)
has zero entries.
In the simplest case of a single output l produced from a single input k, and competitive
demand perceptions for the input (as well as for commodities not used in the production
process), FOC (2.2) boil down to
p¯l + y¯
j
lH
j
ll(a¯, p¯) = q
j
l ,
p¯k = q
j
k,
15Assumption A.4 justifies the restriction of the pricing rule to production plans in ∂Y j . Indeed, under
strictly positive prices a production plan in the interior of Y j cannot be profit maximizing since increasing
yjl , where l corresponds to a zero row of H
j(a¯, p¯)>, increases the profits of firm j.
16Cf. Clarke (1983), Proposition 2.3.1 and corollary to Proposition 2.4.3. With Hj(a¯, p¯) NSD and Y j
convex, the FOC are necessary and sufficient for a global maximum.
17In the special case where the production possibility set Y j is described by a differentiable transfor-
mation function F j : RL → R with the property that F j(yj) ≤ 0 if and only if yj ∈ Y j , the usual
Kuhn-Tucker conditions deliver FOC (2.2) with qj equal to a non-negative multiple of ∂F j(y¯j). The vector
qj is therefore related to the marginal rate of transformation of good l for good k at y¯j , which equals
∂yjl
F j(y¯j)/∂yjkF
j(y¯j).
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which in turn implies
p¯l
(
1 +Hjll(a¯, p¯)
y¯jl
p¯l
)
= p¯k
qjl
qjk
= p¯kMRTlk(y¯
j), (2.3)
the well-known formula that output price times one plus the output elasticity of price equals
marginal cost. FOC (2.2) hold with any number of inputs and outputs, whose prices may
or may not react to the firm’s choice of yj. 2
The presence of (a¯, p¯) as determinants of the matrix Hj(a¯, p¯) reflects the obvious depen-
dence of demand perceptions at the firm level upon the market data. Thus, the perceived
elasticity of demand for output l of firm j is apt to depend upon, for instance, the market
prices of substitutes l′ not supplied by firm j; or the aggregate supply of commodity l by
competitors of j at a price p¯l.
Consider equation (2.2). Since qj ∈ N j(y¯j), it can be written as λq¯j with λ ≥ 0 and
q¯j ∈ ∆. Since pij(y¯j; a¯, p¯) = p¯, λ is equal to 1+ ι>Hj(a¯, p¯)>y¯j. Equation (2.2) may therefore
be rewritten as
p¯ = (1 + ι>Hj(a¯, p¯)>y¯j)q¯j −Hj(a¯, p¯)y¯j.
From this it would be tempting to define the pricing rule ϕ¯j at y¯j by
ϕ¯j(y¯j; a¯, p¯) = {pj ∈ RL | ∃q¯j ∈ N j(y¯j)∩∆ : pj = (1+ ι>Hj(a¯, p¯)>y¯j)q¯j −Hj(a¯, p¯)y¯j}.
However, λ = 1 + ι>Hj(a¯, p¯)>y¯j may be negative, in which case p¯ ∈ ϕ¯j(y¯j; a¯, p¯) does not
imply that the firm maximizes profits at y¯j given market data (a¯, p¯).
To avoid this problem, we define the pricing rule ϕj at y¯j by
ϕj(y¯j; a¯, p¯) = {pj ∈ RL | ∃q¯j ∈ N j(y¯j) ∩∆ :
pj = max(0, 1 + ι>Hj(a¯, p¯)>y¯j)q¯j − H
j(a¯, p¯)>y¯j
max(1,−ι>Hj(a¯, p¯)>y¯j)}.
When 1+ι>Hj(a¯, p¯)>y¯j ≥ 0, the first-order condition (2.2) holds whenever p¯ ∈ ϕj(y¯j; a¯, p¯).
Otherwise, pj = Hj(a¯, p¯)>y¯j/ι>Hj(a¯, p¯)>y¯j for all pj ∈ ϕj(y¯j; a¯, p¯). Since Hj(a¯, p¯)> con-
tains at least one vanishing row, the corresponding element of pj is set equal to zero. Under
Assumption A.2, p¯l = 0 is impossible at equilibrium, implying that the adjustment to the
first-order-condition does not matter in equilibrium.
We must also define the pricing rule for yj 6= y¯j. Since this case is incompatible with
equilibrium, we may use any specification that satisfies P.1 and P.2. The simplest such
specification is the following:
ϕj(yj; a¯, p¯) = {pj ∈ RL | ∃q¯j ∈ N j(yj) ∩∆ :
pj = max(0, 1 + ι>Hj(a¯, p¯)>yj)q¯j − H
j(a¯, p¯)>yj
max(1,−ι>Hj(a¯, p¯)>yj)}. (2.4)
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This amounts to using at yj 6= y¯j the matrix of partial derivatives Hj(a¯, p¯) characterizing
demand perceptions at (a¯, p¯).
Lemma 2.5 Under Assumption A.3, for (yj; a¯, p¯) in a compact set, the pricing rule (2.4)
satisfies P.1 and P.2.
Lemma 2.5 allows DDS to invoke Theorem 2.3 and state an existence theorem, that we
extend to kinky perceived demands in Section 3.
3 Real equilibria under kinky demands perceived by
firms
3.1 Pricing rules
Extending the model of Section 2 to kinky perceived demands looks at first sight straight-
forward: just replace the demand function (2.1) by a function with a kink at y¯j; and draw
the implications for profit maximization!
Example 3.1 This natural intuition is readily illustrated by an extension of Example 2.4
to asymmetrical perceived demand elasticities. Assume that the firm perceives alterna-
tive demand slopes Hj+ll (a¯, p¯) and H
j−
ll (a¯, p¯) applicable respectively to increases (dy
j
l > 0)
and decreases (dyjl < 0) of y¯
j
l . That is, the firm holds a kinky demand perception at y¯
j.
In order for the objective function of the firm to be concave, it must be the case that
Hj+ll (a¯, p¯)y¯
j
l ≤ Hj−ll (a¯, p¯)y¯jl . Under that condition, it is readily verified that the FOC are
given by the inequalities
p¯l(1 +H
j+
ll (a¯, p¯)
y¯jl
p¯l
) ≤ p¯k q
j
l
qjk
≤ p¯l(1 +Hj−ll (a¯, p¯)
y¯jl
p¯l
), (3.1)
which generalize naturally the equality (2.3). Under (3.1), marginal revenue of the last
unit of y¯jl covers marginal cost, possibly with a profit margin; but marginal revenue of an
extra unit does not. 2
Beyond the simplicity of the intuition and of the example, a number of new technical issues
arise in extending (3.1) to the general case (many goods, abstract technology). These are
handled through Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4, proved in the Appendix. The resulting pricing rule
(3.7) relates to (2.4) in basically the same way that (3.1) relates to (2.3). Lemma 3.5
parallels Lemma 2.5.
10
In order to study kinks in RL, note first that RL has 2L orthants (thus, 2 for the line
R, 4 for the plane R2, 8 for R3, etc.). Index these orthants by the L-vectors s ∈ S, where
S = {s ∈ RL | for every l ∈ L, either sl = +1 or sl = −1}.
An orthant with origin at 0 ∈ RL, denoted RL(0, s), is then defined by
RL(0, s) = {v ∈ RL| for every l ∈ L, sl(vl − 0) ≥ 0}.
A piecewise linear L-dimensional demand function with a kink at y¯j thus has (potentially)
2L different derivatives, one for each displaced orthant of RL with origin at y¯j. We define
RL(y¯j, s) = {y ∈ RL | for every l ∈ L, sl(yl − y¯l) ≥ 0}.
At an interior point yj of a displaced orthant defined by a sign vector s, the perceived
demands are linear, with partial derivatives
∂pijk
∂yjl
(yj; a¯, p¯) = Hjskl (a¯, p¯),
resulting in a matrixHjs(a¯, p¯). Using these definitions, we extend (2.1) to perceived demand
functions with a kink at y¯j, defined by
pij(yj; a¯, p¯) = p¯+Hjs(a¯, p¯)(yj − y¯j), s ∈ S, yj ∈ RL(y¯j, s). (3.2)
In order for y¯j to be a profit-maximizing vector under the piecewise linear perceived de-
mands (3.2), 2L inequalities must be satisfied - extending the two inequalities in (3.1);
namely, the 2L directional derivatives of yj
>
pij(yj; a¯, p¯) in the 2L displaced orthants RL(y¯j, s)
correspond to non-increasing profits. That is for all s ∈ S, for all dyj such that y¯j + dyj ∈
RL(y¯j, s),
dyj
>
p¯+ (y¯j + dyj)>Hjs(a¯, p¯)dyj ≤ 0.
The next lemma shows that there is no need to specify 2L matrices Hjs(a¯, p¯). Once the
matrix corresponding to the sign vector with every component +1, denoted Hj+(a¯, p¯), and
the matrix corresponding to the sign vector with every component −1, denoted Hj−(a¯, p¯),
are given, piecewise linearity of the perceived inverse demand function pij implies that
column l of Hjs(a¯, p¯) equals column l of Hj−(a¯, p¯) if sl = −1 and equals column l of
Hj+(a¯, p¯) if sl = +1.
Lemma 3.2 If pij is a piecewise linear perceived inverse demand function with a kink at y¯j
given market data (a¯, p¯), then
Hjs·l (a¯, p¯) =
{
Hj−·l (a¯, p¯) if sl = −1,
Hj+·l (a¯, p¯) if sl = +1.
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Proof: See Appendix.
Motivated by Lemma 3.2, our primitives are Hj−(a¯, p¯), Hj+(a¯, p¯), the NSD matrices of
demand derivatives applicable respectively to negative and positive adjustments dyj. Ac-
cordingly, every matrix Hjs(a¯, p¯) consists of columns borrowed from either Hj−(a¯, p¯) or
Hj+(a¯, p¯), depending upon the sign vector s. Moreover, for s ∈ S, we shall require the
matrices Hjs(a¯, p¯) to be NSD.
Lemma 3.3 provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for y¯j to be a profit maxi-
mizing production plan given market data (a¯, p¯).
Lemma 3.3 The production plan y¯j maximizes profits given market data (a¯, p¯) if and only
if for every s ∈ S, there exists qjs ∈ N j(y¯j) and µjs ∈ RL(0, s) such that18
p¯+Hjs(a¯, p¯)>y¯j = qjs − µjs.
Proof: See Appendix.
Using the necessary and sufficient conditions of Lemma 3.3, we can derive the following
simpler conditions, which we will prove to be sufficient.
Lemma 3.4: The production plan y¯j maximizes profits given market data (a¯, p¯) if there
exists qj ∈ N j(y¯j) such that the following pair of inequalities is satisfied:
p¯ ≥ qj −Hj−(a¯, p¯)>y¯j, (3.3)
p¯ ≤ qj −Hj+(a¯, p¯)>y¯j. (3.4)
Proof: See Appendix.
Notice that existence of solutions to (3.3)–(3.4) requires
Hj+(a¯, p¯)>y¯j ≤ Hj−(a¯, p¯)>y¯j. (3.5)
This condition is implied by concavity of the objective function of the firm.
Using (3.5) and building upon (2.4) it would be natural to define the pricing rule as
ϕ¯j(yj; a¯, p¯) = {pj ∈ S | ∃ q¯j ∈ N j(yj) ∩∆ such that
max(0, 1 + ι>H¯j(a¯, p¯)>yj)q¯j − H
j−(a¯, p¯)>yj
max(1,−ι>H¯j(a¯, p¯)>yj) ≤ p
j ≤
max(0, 1 + ι>H¯j(a¯, p¯)>yj)q¯j − H
j+(a¯, p¯)>yj
max(1,−ι>H¯j(a¯, p¯)>yj)},
18Observe that µjs ∈ RL(0, s) if and only if µjsl sl ≥ 0, for all l ∈ L.
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where H¯j = (Hj−+Hj+)/2.19 The problem of this specification is that ϕ¯j is empty valued if
it is not the case thatHj+(a¯, p¯)>yj ≤ Hj−(a¯, p¯)>yj, which may occur for some yj ∈ ∂Y j. To
solve this problem, we adapt the pricing rule for yj 6= y¯j by letting Hj+ and Hj− depend on
yj. We denote the resulting matrices by Hj+(yj; a¯, p¯) and Hj−(yj; a¯, p¯), imposing only that
Hjs(yj; a¯, p¯) is NSD for all s ∈ S (Assumption A.3’ below), that Hj−(y¯j; a¯, p¯) = Hj−(a¯, p¯)
and Hj+(y¯j; a¯, p¯) = Hj+(a¯, p¯), and
Hj+(yj; a¯, p¯)>yj ≤ Hj−(yj; a¯, p¯)>yj. (3.6)
Since in equilibrium yj = y¯j, the specification of these matrices for yj 6= y¯j is immaterial.
We obtain the following definition of the pricing rule:
ϕj(yj; a¯, p¯) = {pj ∈ S | ∃ q¯j ∈ N j(yj) ∩∆ such that
max(0, 1 + ι>H¯j(yj; a¯, p¯)>yj)q¯j − H
j−(yj; a¯, p¯)>yj
max(1,−ι>H¯j(yj; a¯, p¯)>yj) ≤ p
j ≤
max(0, 1 + ι>H¯j(yj; a¯, p¯)>yj)q¯j − H
j+(yj; a¯, p¯)>yj
max(1,−ι>H¯j(yj; a¯, p¯)>yj)}. (3.7)
It is readily verified that, given (3.6), and whether or not 1 + ι>H¯j(yj; a¯, p¯)>yj ≥ 0, the
left-hand side vector is less than or equal to the right-hand side vector; and the elements
of these vectors sum up to no more than one on the left and no less than one on the right.
Thus, (3.7) admits solutions with ι>p = 1; but that property must be imposed through
the additional side condition pj ∈ S: otherwise not all solutions of (3.7) need satisfy it.
When Hj−(·) ≡ Hj+(·), (3.7) reduces to (2.4); when Hj−(·) ≡ Hj+(·) ≡ 0, the pric-
ing rule defines competitive behavior (prices in N j(yj), hence sustaining yj as a profit-
maximizing production plan at given prices). Thus, (3.7) encompasses a hierarchy of
market situations.
3.2 Existence of equilibrium
An equilibrium under pricing rules is still defined by Definition 2.2. To prove existence,
we must extend Assumptions A.3 and A.4 to allow for kinks.
(A.3’) For each j ∈ J , the mapping (Hj−, Hj+) : ∂Y j × A × ∆ → R2L2 which maps
(yj, a¯, p¯) to (Hj−(yj; a¯, p¯), Hj+(yj; a¯, p¯)) is continuous and the matrices Hj−(yj; a¯, p¯),
Hj+(yj; a¯, p¯), as well as the derived matrices Hjs(yj; a¯, p¯), s ∈ S, are NSD. It holds
that (Hj−(y¯j; a¯, p¯), Hj+(y¯j; a¯, p¯)) = (Hj−(a¯, p¯), Hj+(a¯, p¯)).20
19Any H¯j satisfying Hj+(·)>yj ≤ H¯j(·)>yj ≤ Hj−(·)>yj would do; there is no loss of generality in
using the mean of Hj+ and Hj−, but there is an economy of notation.
20We impose assumptions on (Hj−,Hj+) as functions defined on ∂Y j ×A×∆. We could instead have
taken (Hj−,Hj+) as defined on A × ∆ as a primitive, and then define them on Y j × A × ∆ by taking
appropriate extensions and projections.
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(A.4’) For each j ∈ J , there exists at least one commodity lˆ(j) such that row lˆ(j) of
both matrices Hj−(yj; a¯, p¯)> and Hj+(yj; a¯, p¯)> consists of zero entries, identically in
(yj, a¯, p¯).
(A.5) For each j ∈ J , for each yj ∈ ∂Y j, the inequalities
Hj+(yj; a¯, p¯)>yj ≤ Hj−(yj; a¯, p¯)>yj
hold.
Lemma 3.5 Under Assumptions A.3’ and A.5, for (yj, a¯, p¯) in a compact set, the pricing
rule (3.7) satisfies P.1 and P.2.
Proof: See Appendix.
Lemma 3.5 plays a central role in our analysis. It allows us to apply Theorem 2.3 and to
state:
Theorem 3.6 For the economy of Section 3.1, under Assumptions A.3’, A.4’, and A.5,
there exists an equilibrium with pricing rules as defined by (3.7); that is, with profit maxi-
mization under possibly kinky perceived demand functions.
4 Real equilibria under kinky demands perceived by
unions
4.1 Background
As mentioned cursorily in Section 1.2, the literature discusses several formulations of the
wage determination problem when labor is organized as unions. One important distinction
concerns the process itself, either bargaining between firms and unions, or wage-setting by
unions followed by hiring decisions of the firms. In either case, the objective functions of
the unions must be specified.
Bargaining models are typically asymmetrical Nash, with a parameter measuring the
relative bargaining powers of employers and unions; see, e.g. Arnsperger and de la Croix
(1993), Licandro (1995), or Be´nassy (2002, Chapter 5). These authors eschew the “objec-
tive function” issue by assuming identical workers. We do not follow the bargaining path,
since our purpose is to explore kinky demand curves perceived by unions.
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There is a significant literature on wage-setting unions, dating as far back as Dunlop
(1944). Typically, that literature deals with objective demand curves obtained analytically
in simplified models. Dunlop, or more recently Hart (1982), equates the union’s objective
to the aggregate wage bill. Some authors endow unions outright with a utility function;
e.g., Oswald (1979) or Calmfors (1982). Others assume that union members have identical
preferences - e.g. Snower (1983); others still endow individual workers with market power
- e.g. Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) or Be´nassy (2002, Chapter 4). Blair and Craw-
ford (1984) and Farber (1986) handle heterogeneous preferences through a “median voter”
model, and recognize its limitations. Negishi (1979, Chapter 17) also assumes identical
preferences across union members, but relies on perceived demand functions with kinks.21
The general equilibrium framework used here has both strengths and weaknesses for
modeling unions and non-clearing labor markets. In a framework encompassing time and
uncertainty, every agent (firm, household, or labor union) is concerned with several la-
bor markets. We are not appraised of simplified models with objective demand curves
applicable to a general multi-market framework. On the other hand, existence proofs in
general equilibrium theory rely on strong continuity properties. Accordingly, models with
fixed labor time (working week), where workers are either employed full-time or totally
inactive, are not covered by the standard theory; they are unwieldy, unless one introduces
a continuum of workers. We must accordingly proceed under the restrictive assumption
that aggregate employment on a specific unionized labor market is divided among union
members in a continuous way. This is the price of generality, in the present context.22
4.2 A simple example
Before proceeding to the formal analysis, it is helpful to review a simple example, with (i)
a single type of labor supplied by the members of a wage-setting union; and (ii) member
preferences represented by C1 utility functions.
Example 4.1 Consider a union with n members, setting the wage w for a single type of
labor. Aggregate employment is denoted `, and the perceived inverse demand function of
the union is w(`), with dw
d`
< 0. Each member h of the union will supply a quantity of
labor `h(`), with d`
h
d`
≥ 0 and ∑h `h(`) ≡ ` > 0. Union member h has a disposable income
yh = w`h, and preferences represented by the mixed direct-indirect C1 utility function
uh(`h, yh) = uh(`h, w`h).
21For a survey of the union-wage model, see Oswald (1985). Models with union utility or with identical
members are special cases of our model. Wage bill maximization is at variance with our approach; see
Remark (vi) in Subsection 4.2.
22See however Remark (iv) at the end of Subsection 4.2.
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The total derivative of uh with respect to ` is:
duh
d`
=
∂uh
∂`h
d`h
d`
+
∂uh
∂yh
(w
d`h
d`
+
dw
d`
`h).
A level of employment ` is Pareto-efficient for the union members if it maximizes∑
h µ
huh(`h, w`h) for some positive vector of weights µh. The FOC for that problem is∑
h
µh
duh
d`
=
∑
h
µh
∂uh
∂yh
{wd`
h
d`
+
∂uh/∂`h
∂uh/∂yh
d`h
d`
+
dw
d`
`h} = 0. (4.1)
Because ∂u
h
∂yh
has arbitrary scale, the terms µh ∂u
h
∂yh
are undetermined individual coefficients
assigned to member incomes in the optimization problems. (In contrast, all the terms
in the curly brackets are well-defined.) A union not pursuing interpersonal redistributive
policies23 behaves as if it assigned equal weights to the incomes of all its members, i.e. as if
µh ∂u
h
∂yh
were independent of h. In that case, using
∑
h
d`h
d`
= 1, (4.1) may be rewritten as:24
w = −
∑
h
∂uh/∂`h
∂uh/∂yh
d`h
d`
− dw
d`
`. (4.2)
The first term in (4.2) contains the marginal rates of substitution between work and in-
come of all union members, weighted by their stakes in marginal adjustments of aggregate
employment d`. Two remarks:
(i) This is exactly the formula defining shadow prices for future state-dependent outputs
supporting production plans that are Pareto-efficient for shareholders, under incomplete
markets (Dre`ze 1974).
(ii) Marginal rates of substitution between work and income define the reservation
wages of workers.
Formula (4.2) thus admits of a natural interpretation: union wages should correspond
to average reservation wages of members, augmented with a markup reflecting the demand
elasticity.
We show that formula (4.2) is analogous to formula (2.3). Let Hk be the set of members
of union k.Write ykl for aggregate employment ` of members of union k, p¯l = pi
k
l (y¯
k; a¯, p¯) for
the wage (“price”) w and Hkll(a¯, p¯) for dw/d`, assuming market signals (a¯, p¯), where y¯
k is
consistent with market data, so y¯kl = −
∑
h∈Hk(x¯
h
l −ehl ). Define furthermore λh = − ∂u
h/∂`h
∂uh/∂yh
and λk =
∑
h∈Hk λ
h d`h
d`
. Then (4.2) may be written as
p¯l
(
1 +Hkll(a¯, p¯)
y¯kl
p¯l
)
= λk, (4.3)
23Others might write: a democratic union, not bestowing preferential treatment upon individual mem-
bers . . .
24With `h ≥ 0, ∂uh
∂`h
≤ 0 so that the first term in (4.2) is non-negative.
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where the right-hand side term is equal to the average reservation wage of union k members,
i.e. to the marginal opportunity cost of y¯kl at (a¯, p¯).
Let now the union entertain kinky demand perceptions, with d
+w
d`
for d` > 0 and d
−w
d`
for d` < 0, d
+w
d`
` ≤ d−w
d`
` ≤ 0. The FOC (4.2) should then be replaced by the pair of
inequalities
w +
d+w
d`
` ≤ −
∑
h∈Hk
∂uh/∂`h
∂uh/∂yh
d`h
d`
≤ w + d
−w
d`
`.
In the notation of (4.3), this becomes
p¯l
(
1 +Hk+ll (a¯, p¯)
y¯kl
p¯l
)
≤ λk ≤ p¯l
(
1 +Hk−ll (a¯, p¯)
y¯kl
p¯l
)
. (4.4)
This formula is analogous to formula (3.1) above - up to the replacement of marginal cost
p¯kq¯
j
l /q¯
j
k by an opportunity cost λ
k here. 2
Beyond the transparency of the example, a number of new technical issues arise in ex-
tending (4.4) to the general case (many goods, many unions). These are handled largely
through Theorem 4.3, proved in the Appendix.
Before leaving this example, we add four further remarks.
(iii) The term ∂u
h
∂`h
is naturally interpreted as the “marginal disutility of work,” a negative
number. In the present context, it could also be interpreted as a “marginal opportunity
cost” of union employment rather than other employment, also negative - but perhaps
more significant.
(iv) In the case of fixed working time cum unemployment, the term d`
h
d`
would cor-
respond: for an unemployed, to the probability of being hired under d` > 0, namely
1
n−`d`; for an employed, to the probability of being fired under d` < 0, namely
1
`
d`. In
that case, the benefit of being hired (of not being fired) is given by the finite difference
uh(`h, w`h)− uh|`h=0. The second term in that difference requires explanation. If it called
for another job at lower wages but similar hours, the difference could be expressed as the
product of the wage differential by a marginal utility of income (mean value theorem),
leading back to a formula comparable to (4.1), hence (4.2).
(v) Formula (4.2) suggests that a union concerned with the well-being of its members
should elicit their reservation wages −∂uh
∂`h
/∂u
h
∂yh
in order to set wages according to (4.2).
That may seem preposterous . . . yet it is perhaps a meaningful characterization of union
behavior in some countries. We could adopt a less precise formulation, still consistent with
(4.2); namely that unions set wages on the basis of shadow prices λk which are single valued
continuous monotone functions of the members’ reservation wages. This would allow for
λk depending on the reservation wages of a subset (possibly random) of union members.
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(vi) It is readily seen in formula (4.2) that identical union members correspond to a
special case of our approach. On the other hand, maximizing (with respect to `) the wage
bill w` would lead to the FOC w + dw
d`
` = 0, at variance with (4.2).
4.3 General formulation
To formalize and generalize the foregoing, we must extend the primitives of Section 2.1 by
adding unions to the set of agents and by adjusting primitive (c) concerning households.
We define a union k by: (i) the set of labor markets on which it sets wages; (ii) its mem-
bership, consisting of households supplying such labor; (iii) the rules allocating aggregate
employment among union members; (iv) the set of employment levels which are feasible
for the membership; (v) the objective function of the union. We postpone item (v), which
is crucial to our formulation, to Section 4.4. Items (i) and (ii) are straightforward. For
item (iii), we adopt the simplest formulation, namely fixed proportions. It is then possible
to handle (iv) on the basis of upper bounds on the labor supply of individual households.
Thus, we add to the primitives of Section 2.1:
(d) A set K of K unions indexed by k; each union k is defined by: (i) the set Lk  L of
Lk labor markets on which it sets wages, with Lk ∩ Lk′ = ∅ for all k′ ∈ K \ {k}; (ii)
the set Hk  H of nk households which are members of k, with Hk ∩Hk′ = ∅ for all
k′ ∈ K\{k}; (iii) for h ∈ Hk and l ∈ Lk, labor allocation coefficients σhkl ≤ 0,
∑
h∈Hk
σhkl = −1;25 and (iv) the vector yˆk ∈ RL+ with yˆkl = 0 for l /∈ Lk defining maximally
feasible employment levels for union k.
We shall treat union k as if it were a firm supplying labor of types l ∈ Lk to the rest of the
economy, in quantities ykl ≥ 0, with ykl ≤ yˆkl . As we will assume zero initial endowments of
commodities in Lk, feasibility then requires −∑h∈Hk xhl = ykl =∑h/∈Hk xhl −∑j∈J yjl . For
l /∈ Lk, we impose ykl = 0. More concisely, we write yk = (kyk, ykk) ∈ {0} × RLk+ ; and we
partition other vectors similarly, for instance xh = (kxh, xhk), p = (kp, pk), and so on. We
define the set Y k by Y k = {yk ∈ RL+ | yk ≤ yˆk}.
Regarding households, we add the following assumption:
(A.6) 1. For each k ∈ K, for all h ∈ Hk, Xh = kXh ×Xhk, where kXh = {kxh}+ RL−Lk+
and Xhk = {xh ∈ RLk | for l ∈ Lk, σhkl yˆkl ≤ xhl ≤ 0}.
2. The preferences h are represented by a continuously differentiable strictly
quasi-concave utility function uh : Xh → R with strictly positive partial deriva-
tives.
25We treat union employment levels ykl as non-negative quantitities; household labor supplies x
h
l are
non-positive quantitities; hence, xhl = σ
hk
l y
k
l requires σ
hk
l ≤ 0.
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3. For all h ∈ H, for each l ∈ ∪k∈KLk, ehl = 0.
Assumption A.6.1 states that consumption sets have a product form. The product form
guarantees that the labor supply determined by the union is consistent with individual
consumption sets. Assumption A.6.3 normalizes the endowments of “union labor.”
The vectors yk need not be explicitly introduced into the market clearing conditions.
Equilibrium requires that, for each k ∈ K : (i) there exists y¯k ∈ Y k such that x¯hl = σhkl y¯kl
for all h ∈ Hk and l ∈ Lk; and (ii) p¯ ∈ ϕk(y¯k; a¯, p¯), where ϕk denotes the pricing rule of
union k, to be defined in (4.10). There is no need to explicitly introduce y¯k in the definition
of a feasible allocation a¯, since feasibility requires, for l ∈ Lk,
y¯kl = −
∑
h∈Hk
x¯hl ,
so y¯k follows from a¯. On the other hand, the presence of unions imposes an additional
condition on the allocation in equilibrium; if a¯ is an equilibrium allocation, then for each
k ∈ K, there is y¯k ∈ Y k with, for h ∈ Hk and l ∈ Lk, x¯hl = σhkl y¯kl . To simplify notation, for
k ∈ K, we define the function σhk : Y k → RLk by σhkl (yk) = σhkl ykl , l ∈ Lk.
In line with Sections 2.4 and 3.1, we assume that union k perceives the inverse demand
functions
pik(yk; a¯, p¯) = p¯+Hks(a¯, p¯)(yk − y¯k), s ∈ S, yk ∈ RL(y¯k, s).
As for firms, information on perceived demand functions can be summarized by NSD
matrices Hk+(a¯, p¯) and Hk−(a¯, p¯). Regarding these we make the following assumption.
(A.7) For each k ∈ K, the mapping (Hk−, Hk+) : Y k × A × ∆ → R2L2 which maps
(a¯, p¯) to (Hk−(yk; a¯, p¯), Hk+(yk; a¯, p¯)) is continuous and the matrices Hk−(yk; a¯, p¯),
Hk+(yk; a¯, p¯), as well as the derived matrices Hks(yk; a¯, p¯), s ∈ S, are NSD. It holds
that (Hk−(y¯k; a¯, p¯), Hk+(y¯k; a¯, p¯)) = (Hk−(a¯, p¯), Hk+(a¯, p¯)). For each k ∈ K, for each
yk ∈ Y k, the matrices Hk−(yk; a¯, p¯) and Hk+(yk; a¯, p¯) have rows and columns of zeros
for all commodities l ∈ L \ Lk, and the inequalities
Hk+(yk; a¯, p¯)>yk ≤ Hk−(yk; a¯, p¯)>yk
hold.
Write further Hkks(a¯, p¯) for the Lk × Lk submatrix of Hks(a¯, p¯) corresponding to the rows
and columns in Lk.
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4.4 Unions enhancing members’ welfare
Household h solves the problem
maxkxh u
h(kxh, σhk(yk)) s.t. kp>kxh + pk
>
σhk(yk) ≤ p>eh +∑j θhjp>yj,
(kxh, σhk(yk)) ∈ Xh. (4.5)
Associated with a solution x¯h = (kx¯h, σhk(yk)) of problem (4.5), we define the normalized
vector of marginal utilities λ¯h by λ¯hl = pl, l ∈ L\Lk, and λ¯hl = ∂xhl uh(x¯h)/λ¯h0 , l ∈ Lk, where
λ¯h0 denotes the Lagrange multiplier for h’s budget constraint. The specification of λ¯
h
l for
l ∈ L \ Lk may not correspond to the actual normalized marginal utility of household h
since boundary solutions are allowed for. This does not affect our analysis, as it is only
the specification of λ¯hk for l ∈ Lk that matters. Our assumptions on uh imply that λ¯h0 > 0.
It holds that uh(x¯h + dxh) ≤ uh(x¯h) whenever x¯h + dxh ∈ Xh and dxh>λ¯h ≤ 0.
We may now characterize the vectors ((x¯h)h∈Hk , y¯k) that are Pareto efficient from the
viewpoint of union members.
Definition 4.2 Consumption bundles and employment levels ((x¯h)h∈Hk , y¯k) with associ-
ated prices (i.e. wages) pik(y¯k; a¯, p¯) are Pareto efficient forHk at market signals (a¯, p¯) if there
do not exist alternative employment levels y˜k ∈ Y k with associated prices p˜ = pik(y˜k; a, p),
and alternative consumption vectors x˜h ∈ Xh, h ∈ Hk, with∑
h∈Hk
(p˜>x˜h − p¯>x¯h) ≤ 0, (4.6)
x˜hk = σhk(y˜k), h ∈ Hk, (4.7)
uh(x˜h) > uh(x¯h), h ∈ Hk. (4.8)
This is the standard definition (non-existence of a superior feasible alternative), applied
here to the members of union k at unchanged prices for commodities not under the control
of union k (kp˜ = kp¯) and unchanged property incomes.
Because the perceived inverse demand functions pik are piecewise linear and the labor
allocation rules are linear, we may translate that definition into an alternative formulation
geared to our purpose.
Theorem 4.3 Under Assumptions A.6 and A.7, for given market data (a¯, p¯), for h ∈ Hk,
let x¯h solve problem (4.5) with associated normalized vector of marginal utilities λ¯h. If∑
h∈Hk
−dσ
hk
dykk
λ¯hk −Hkk−(a¯, p¯)>y¯kk ≤ p¯k ≤
∑
h∈Hk
−dσ
hk
dykk
λ¯hk −Hkk+(a¯, p¯)>y¯kk, (4.9)
where the lower bound on p¯kl is omitted for l ∈ Lk such that y¯kl = 0 and the upper bound
on p¯kl is omitted for l ∈ Lk such that y¯kl = yˆkl , then ((x¯h)h∈Hk , y¯k) is Pareto efficient for
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Hk at (a¯, p¯).
Proof: See Appendix.
4.5 Pricing rules
At a solution kx¯h to (4.5), it holds that the Lagrange multiplier for h’s budget constraint,
λ¯h0 , is equal to
max
l∈L\Lk
∂xhl u
h(kx¯h, σhk(yk))
pl
.
The formulation with the maximum is needed, as boundary consumption is not excluded.
This motivates the definition of the function λh : Y k × A×∆→ RL by
λhl (y
k; a¯, p¯) =
 p¯l, l ∈ L \ L
k,(
minl′∈L\Lk
p¯l′
∂
xh
l′
uh(kx¯h,σhk(yk))
)
∂xhl u
h(kx¯h, σhk(yk)), l ∈ Lk.
It is not difficult to show that the function λh is continuous. Next we define the continuous
function λk : Y k × A×∆→ RL+ by
kλk(yk; a¯, p¯) = kp¯,
λkk(yk; a¯, p¯) = −
∑
h∈Hk
dσhk
dykk
λhk(yk; a¯, p¯).
That is, λk(yk; a¯, p¯) is a weighted average of normalized vectors of marginal utilities λh(yk; a¯, p¯)
with weights adding to unity. For l /∈ Lk, the weights are immaterial (and omitted in the
above formula); for l ∈ Lk, the weights −dσhkl
dykk
are non-negative and add up to 1. Thus, for
l ∈ Lk, λkl (yk; a¯, p¯) is an average reservation wage of members of k, weighted by marginal
employment shares.
We define the pricing rule of union k, ϕk : Y k × A×∆→ RL by
ϕk(yk; a¯, p¯) = {pk ∈ RL |
λk(yk; a¯, p¯)−Hk−(yk; a¯, p¯)>yk ≤ pk ≤ λk(yk; a¯, p¯)−Hk+(yk; a¯, p¯)>yk}, (4.10)
where, as before, the lower bound on pkl is omitted for l ∈ Lk such that ykl = 0 and the
upper bound on pkl is omitted for l ∈ Lk such that ykl = yˆkl .
Observe that the pricing rule of union k maps into RL and not into S. Since at equi-
librium p¯ ∈ ϕk(yk; a¯, p¯) and p¯ ∈ S, this feature is inessential. For all pk ∈ ϕk(yk; a¯, p¯) we
have that kpk = kp¯. For l ∈ Lk, if pkl exceeds p¯l for all pk ∈ ϕk(a¯, p¯), then the union should
lower ykl at a gain of members’ welfare, and the union should increase y
k
l if p
k
l is less than
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p¯l for all p
k ∈ ϕk(yk; a¯, p¯). Using Theorem 4.3, it is immediate that if p¯ ∈ ϕk(y¯k; a¯, p¯), then
((x¯h)h∈Hk , y¯k) is Pareto efficient for Hk.
Instead of stating here the properties of (4.10) that are conducive to existence of equi-
librium, we postpone that task to Lemma 5.5 below, so as to encompass at once monetary
exchange.
5 The monetary economy
Negishi (1979, p. 28) lists “monetary exchange with cash-in-advance (CIA)” as a “basic
rule of the game” for macroeconomics. We now extend the model of the previous sections
to introduce that rule. Yet, this (already too long) paper is not a paper on monetary
theory. So, our treatment will be streamlined. It is based on Dre`ze and Polemarchakis
(2001b), (hereafter DP), to which readers are referred for a systematic exposition and
generalization.
The logic of the DP model, specialized here to CIA, is elementary. All exchanges are
monetary (no barter). Inside money is created at no cost by a central bank and lent by the
bank to other agents against promise of repayment with interest, at rates r set by the bank.
Time is divided in (short) periods during which trade occurs. Money spent on purchases
must be held at beginning of period; money collected from sales must be held idle until end
of period. If budget constraints and profits are defined in terms of “beginning of period”
values, the relevant price of commodity l is pl in case of a purchase, pl/(1 + r) in case of a
sale. The bank b is owned by households in given fractions θhb ≥ 0, ∑h∈H θhb = 1; bank
profits (seignorage) are distributed to shareholders.
Example 5.1 Consider a single period example, where firm j produces yj. Define a family
of diagonal L× L matrices R(yj) by:
Rll(y
j) =
{
1 if yjl < 0,
1/(1 + r) if yjl ≥ 0.
The beginning-of-period value of profits is then equal to p>R(yj)yj, a piecewise linear
expression with a kink when there is l such that yjl = 0.
In stating FOC conditions for profit maximization, one must take the kinks into account.
If yjl = 0, the relevant price associated with dy
j
l > 0 is pl/(1 + r), whereas with dy
j
l < 0 it
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is pl. This calls for defining two families of diagonal matrices, R
−(yj) and R+(yj), where
R+ll (y
j) =
{
1 if yjl < 0,
1/(1 + r) if yjl ≥ 0,
R−ll (y
j) =
{
1 if yjl ≤ 0,
1/(1 + r) if yjl > 0.
Using these definitions, FOC like (3.3)–(3.4) may be extended to CIA, by multiplying the
price-terms p and ∂p/∂y = H by the suitable matrices R+ or R−. This yields
R−(y¯j)pj ≥ qj −Hj−(a¯, p¯)>R−(y¯j)y¯j, (5.1)
R+(y¯j)pj ≤ qj −Hj+(a¯, p¯)>R+(y¯j)y¯j. (5.2)
The pricing rules (5.5) below relate to (5.1)–(5.2) in basically the same way that the rules
(3.7) relate to (3.3)–(3.4). 2
In a general model involving time and uncertainty, the commodity space is structured on
the basis of an event tree describing the primitive uncertainties and the information of the
agents. The tree has N nodes, or date events, labeled st ∈ N . The interest rates set by
the bank are event-specific, and a distinct CIA constraint applies at each date event st.
The DP paper explains how the corresponding detailed model can be consolidated into an
abstract representation in terms of present value prices for contingent commodities; that
construction extends Chapter 6 of Debreu (1959) to a streamlined monetary economy. The
consolidation is particularly straightforward under the (special) CIA transactions technol-
ogy. We refer readers to DP for details and introduce directly the consolidated version
of the model. Under CIA, it is not even necessary to bring out into the open holdings of
money or nominal assets; so long as the bank supplies cash as demanded by solvent agents,
the only relevant consideration is the discounting of sales receipts under date event st by
the discount factor 1/(1 + rst) applicable there; that discount factor applies unchanged to
present value prices, which are based on “beginning of period accounting” at each date
event. The only additional complication concerns the seignorage revenue of the bank. In
a streamlined consolidation where nominal assets remain implicit, and CIA applies, the
bank is assumed to collect interest for one period on all the cash used by the agents for
their purchases at a date event. In the aggregate, that amount is identical to terminal cash
holdings of the sellers. The bank revenues (seignorage) are distributed at end of period to
households as dividends.
Formally, the commodity space is now RLN and the vector p ∈ RLN+ denotes present
values. We write p> = (p>st)st∈N , where pst ∈ RL+ is the vector of present values (at node, or
time 0) of commodities purchased contingently on date event st. For sales of commodity l at
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st, the relevant price is plst/(1+ rst), where rst ≥ 0 is part of the primitives (is exogenously
set by the bank).
In line with Example 5.1, we define pairs of diagonal matrices R+(yj), R−(yj) of di-
mension LN by
R+lst,lst(y
j) =
{
1 if yjlst < 0,
1/(1 + rst) if y
j
lst
≥ 0,
R−lst,lst(y
j) =
{
1 if yjlst ≤ 0,
1/(1 + rst) if y
j
lst
> 0.
The present value of profits of firm j is then:26
vˆj = p>R+(yj)yj(= p>R−(yj)yj).
Similarly, denoting by zh := xh − eh the transactions of household h, we define diagonal
matrices R◦(zh) by:
R◦lst,lst(z
h) =
{
1/(1 + rst) if z
h
lst
≤ 0,
1 if zhlst > 0.
We denote by vˆh the dividend income of household h, vˆh =
∑
j∈J θ
hj vˆj + θhbvˆb, where vˆb
represents the present value of seignorage. It holds that
vˆb =
∑
st∈N
rst
1 + rst
(
∑
j∈J
p>sty
j
−st +
∑
h∈H
p>stz
h
+st),
where we use the notation, for v ∈ Rn, v+i := max(0, vi) and v−i := max(0,−vi), so that
v = v+ − v−.
The consolidated budget constraint of h is
p>R◦(zh)zh ≤ vˆh.
Pricing rules in the monetary economy are natural extensions of earlier sections.
In the monetary economy with linear perceived inverse demand functions, the firm’s
problem is:
max
yj∈Y j
yj
>
R+(yj)pij(yj; a¯, p¯) = yj
>
R+(yj)(p¯−Hj(a¯, p¯)y¯j) + yj>R+(yj)Hj(a¯, p¯)yj.
In the more general specification of Section 3, with a kinky perceived inverse demand
function, we can replace the sufficient conditions (3.3) and (3.4) by the sufficient conditions
p¯ ≥ R−(yj)−1qj −R−(yj)−1Hj−(a, p)>R−(yj)yj, (5.3)
p¯ ≤ R+(yj)−1qj −R+(yj)−1Hj+(a, p)>R+(yj)yj. (5.4)
To prove existence, we must extend Assumptions A.3’ and A.5 to
26For profit calculations given yj , the distinction between R+(yj) and R−(yj) is unnecessary; for defining
pricing rules, the distinction is necessary, as illustrated in Example 5.1.
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(A.3”) For each j ∈ J , the mapping (Hj−, Hj+) : ∂Y j × A×∆LN → R2L2N2 which maps
(yj, a¯, p¯) to (Hj−(yj; a¯, p¯), Hj+(yj; a¯, p¯)) is continuous and the matrices R−(yj)Hj−
(yj; a, p), R+(yj)Hj+(yj; a, p), as well as the derived matrices R+(yj)Hjs(yj; a, p),
s ∈ S, are NSD. It holds that (Hj−(y¯j; a¯, p¯), Hj+(y¯j; a¯, p¯)) = (Hj−(a¯, p¯), Hj+(a¯, p¯)).
(A.5’) For each j ∈ J , for each yj ∈ ∂Y j, the inequalities
R+(yj)−1Hj+(yj; a, p)>R+(yj)yj ≤ R−(yj)−1Hj−(yj; a, p)>R−(yj)yj
hold.
We define
M j(yj; a, p) =
1
2
R−(yj)−1Hj−(yj; a, p)>R−(yj) +
1
2
R+(yj)−1Hj+(yj; a, p)>R+(yj)
and
µj(yj; a, p) = −ι>M j(yj; a, p)yj.
We define pricing rules for firms in a monetary economy with kinky perceived inverse
demands as follows:
ϕj(yj; a¯, p¯) = {pj ∈ SLN | ∃ q¯j ∈ N j(yj) with ι>R+(yj)−1q¯j = 1 such that
R−(yj)−1q¯j max(0, 1− µj(yj; a¯, p¯))− R
−(yj)−1Hj−(yj; a¯, p¯)>R−(yj)yj
max(1, µj(yj; a¯, p¯))
≤ pj ≤
R+(yj)−1q¯j max(0, 1− µj(yj; a¯, p¯))− R
+(yj)−1Hj+(yj; a¯, p¯)>R+(yj)yj
max(1, µj(yj; a¯, p¯))
}. (5.5)
We now state Lemma 5.2.
Lemma 5.2 Under Assumptions A.3” and A.5’, for (yj, a¯, p¯) in a compact set, the pricing
rule (5.5) satisfies P.1 with ι>pj ≡ 1 for every pj ∈ ϕj(yj; a¯, p¯). For all pj ∈ ϕj(yj; a¯, p¯),
pj
>
R+(yj)yj ≥ 0.
Proof: See Appendix.
We now extend the definition of vectors ((x¯h)h∈Hk , y¯k) that are Pareto efficient from the
viewpoint of union members to the monetary case.
Definition 5.3 Consumption bundles and employment levels ((x¯h)h∈Hk , y¯k) with associ-
ated prices (i.e. wages) pik(y¯k; a¯, p¯) are Pareto efficient forHk at market signals (a¯, p¯) if there
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do not exist alternative employment levels y˜k ∈ Y k with associated prices p˜ = pik(y˜k; a, p),
and alternative consumption vectors x˜h ∈ Xh, h ∈ Hk, with∑
h∈Hk
(p˜>R◦(x˜h − eh)x˜h − p¯>R◦(x¯h − eh)x¯h) ≤ 0, (5.6)
x˜hk = σhk(y˜k), h ∈ Hk, (5.7)
uh(x˜h) > uh(x¯h), h ∈ Hk. (5.8)
This is the standard definition (non-existence of a superior feasible alternative), applied
here to the members of union k at unchanged prices for commodities not under the control
of union k (kp˜ = kp¯) and unchanged property incomes.
We extend Assumption A.7 to
(A.7’) For each k ∈ K, the mapping (Hk−, Hk+) : Y k × A ×∆LN → R2L2N2 which maps
(yk; a¯, p¯) to (Hk−(yk; a¯, p¯), Hk+(yk; a¯, p¯)) is continuous and the matrices
R+(yk)Hk−(yk; a¯, p¯), R+(yk)Hk+(yk; a¯, p¯),
as well as the derived matrices R+(yk)Hks(yk; a¯, p¯), s ∈ S, are NSD. It holds that
(Hk−(y¯k; a¯, p¯), Hk+(y¯k; a¯, p¯)) = (Hk−(a¯, p¯), Hk+(a¯, p¯)). For each k ∈ K, for each yk ∈
Y k, the matrices Hk−(yk; a¯, p¯) and Hk+(yk; a¯, p¯) have rows and columns of zeros for
all commodities lst ∈ (L ×N ) \ (Lk ×N ), and the inequalities
Hk+(yk; a¯, p¯)>R+(yk)yk ≤ Hk−(yk; a¯, p¯)>R+(yk)yk
hold.
Household h solves the problem
maxkxh u
h(kxh, σhk(yk)) s.t. p>R◦(kxh − keh, σhk(yk))(kxh − keh, σhk(yk)) ≤ vˆh,
(kxh, σhk(yk)) ∈ Xh. (5.9)
Associated with a solution x¯h = (kx¯h, σhk(yk)) of problem (5.9), we define the normalized
vector of marginal utilities λ¯h by λ¯hlst = plst , lst ∈ (L × N ) \ (Lk × N ), and λ¯hlst =
∂xhlst
uh(x¯h)/λ¯h0 , lst ∈ Lk × N , where λ¯h0 denotes the Lagrange multiplier for h’s budget
constraint. Assumption A.6.2 implies that λ¯h0 > 0.
As before, we may now characterize the vectors ((x¯h)h∈Hk , y¯k) that are Pareto efficient
from the viewpoint of union members. The proof is an extension of the proof of Theorem 4.3
and is omitted here.
Theorem 5.4 Under Assumptions A.6 and A.7’, for given market data (a¯, p¯), for h ∈ Hk,
let x¯h solve problem (5.9) with associated normalized vector of marginal utilities λ¯h. If∑
h∈Hk
−Rk+(y¯k)−1dσ
hk
dykk
λ¯hk−Hkk−(a¯, p¯)>y¯kk ≤ p¯k ≤
∑
h∈Hk
−Rk+(y¯k)−1dσ
hk
dykk
λ¯hk−Hkk+(a¯, p¯)>y¯kk,
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(5.10)
where the lower bound on p¯klst is omitted for lst ∈ Lk ×N such that y¯klst = 0 and the upper
bound on p¯klst is omitted for lst ∈ Lk×N such that y¯klst = yˆklst , then ((x¯h)h∈Hk , y¯k) is Pareto
efficient for Hk at (a¯, p¯).
In Theorem 5.4 we have written Rk+(y¯k) for the LkN × LkN submatrix of R+(y¯k) corre-
sponding to the rows and columns in Lk ×N .
At a solution kx¯h to (5.9) with vˆh ≥ 0, it holds that the Lagrange multiplier for h’s
budget constraint, λ¯h0 , is equal to
max
lst∈(L×N )\(Lk×N )
∂xhlst
uh(kx¯h, σhk(yk))
p¯lst
.
We can therefore define the functions λh and λk as in the case without money and we
define the pricing rule of union k, ϕk : Y k × A×∆LN → RLN by
ϕk(yk; a¯, p¯) = {pk ∈ RLN | R+(yk)−1λk(yk; a¯, p¯)−Hk−(yk; a¯, p¯)>yk ≤ pk ≤
R+(yk)−1λk(yk; a¯, p¯)−Hk+(yk; a¯, p¯)>yk}, (5.11)
where, as before, the lower bound on pklst is omitted for lst ∈ Lk × N such that yklst = 0
and the upper bound on pklst is omitted for lst ∈ Lk ×N such that yklst = yˆklst .
Due to the omission of lower and upper bounds when yklst = 0 and y
k
lst
= yˆklst , the
correspondence ϕk has unbounded sets as images. For k ∈ K, let ϕ˜k(yk; a, p) be defined
as the subset of ϕk(yk; a, p) as defined in (5.11) that satisfies the lower bound on pklst for
lst ∈ (Lk ×N ) such that yklst = 0 and the upper bound on pklst for lst ∈ Lk ×N such that
yklst = yˆ
k
lst
. We will make use of ϕ˜k in the equilibrium existence proof.
Lemma 5.5 Under Assumptions (A.3”), (A.5’), (A.6), and (A.7’), for (yk, a¯, p¯) ∈ Y k ×
A×∆LN , the correspondence ϕ˜k satisfies P.1.
Proof: The proof follows easily using the continuity of the function λk. Q.E.D.
Lemmas 5.2 and 5.5 are crucial to our main result, the existence theorem in Section 6.
6 Existence of Keynes-Negishi equilibria
We may now bring together the contents of Sections 2-5. The primitives of the economy E
are given by (a)-(d). Beyond the properties of the commodity space in (a), Y j in (b), h
in (c), and the union in (d), the assumptions are: A.1, A.2 in Section 2, A.4’ in Section 3,
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A.6 in Section 4, and A.3”, A.5’, and A.7’ in Section 5.
Definition 6.1 A Keynes-Negishi equilibrium for E is a tuple (p ∈ ∆LN , r ∈ RN+ , (xh)h∈H,
(yj)j∈J , (yk)k∈K) such that
(i) for each h ∈ H, xh is h-maximal over the set
{x˜h ∈ Xh | p>R◦(z˜h)z˜h ≤ vˆh;
if h ∈ Hk, x˜hlst = σhklstyklst for all lst ∈ Lk ×N},
where, for j ∈ J , vˆj = p>R+(yj)yj, vˆb = ∑h∈H p>(I − R◦(zh))zh +∑j∈J p>(I −
R+(yj))yj, and vˆh =
∑
j∈J θ
hj vˆj + θhbvˆb;
(ii) for each j ∈ J , yj ∈ Y j; for all y˜j ∈ Y j, y˜j ∈ RLN(yj, s) for some sign vector s,
p>R+(yj)yj ≥ (p+Hjs(a, p)(y˜j − yj))>R+(y˜j)y˜j;
(iii) for each k ∈ K, yk ∈ Y k; and ((xh)h∈Hk , yk) is Pareto efficient for Hk at (a, p), so
there do not exist y˜k ∈ Y k, y˜k ∈ RLN(yk, s) for some sign vector s, and, for h ∈ Hk,
x˜h ∈ Xh, where p˜ = Hks(a, p)(y˜k − yk) + p such that∑
h∈Hk
(p˜>R◦(z˜h)x˜h − p>R◦(zh)xh) ≤ 0,
x˜hk = σhk(y˜k), h ∈ Hk,
x˜h h xh, h ∈ Hk;
(iv)
∑
h∈H x
h =
∑
h∈H e
h +
∑
j∈J y
j.
The unfamiliar conditions in (ii) and (iii) admit a natural interpretation. The conditions
in (ii) state that profits at yj computed at equilibrium prices (p, r) are at least as high as
profits at any feasible alternative y˜j, taking into account the price adjustments Hjs(·)(y˜j−
yj) associated with the move from yj to y˜j. These adjustments bring in the matrix of price
derivatives Hjs(·) geared to the signs slst of the quantity adjustments (y˜jlst−yjlst). Similarly,
the conditions in (iii) state that ((xh)h∈Hk , yk) cannot be Pareto improved by an admissible
tuple ((x˜h)h∈Hk , y˜k) taking into account the price adjustments Hks(·)(y˜k − yk) associated
with the move from yk to y˜k. These adjustments bring in the matrix of price derivatives
Hks(·) geared to the signs slst of the quantity adjustments (y˜klst − yklst). Conditions (ii) and
(iii) may be written alternatively as:
(ii’) for each j ∈ J , yj ∈ Y j and p ∈ ϕj(yj; a, p) as defined by (5.5);
(iii’) for each k ∈ K, yk ∈ Y k and p ∈ ϕk(yk; a, p) as defined by (5.11).
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It is readily verified that a tuple (p ∈ RLN+ , r ∈ RN+ , (xh)h∈H, (yj)j∈J , (yk)k∈K) satisfying
Conditions (i) and (iv) of Definition 6.1 and additionally the requirement that for j ∈ J ,
p ∈ ϕj(yj; a, p), and for k ∈ K, p ∈ ϕk(yk; a, p), is a Keynes-Negishi equilibrium.
Theorem 6.2 For the economy E defined by (a)-(d), under assumptions A.1, A.2, A.3”,
A.4’, A.5’, A.6, and A.7’, given any r ∈ RN+ , there exists a Keynes-Negishi equilibrium.
Proof: See Appendix.
Until now, prices have been normalized to belong to ∆LN . In a monetary economy, it is
not natural to do so. It is straightforward to extend all the previous definitions and results
to the case where p ∈ RLN+ \ {0}. We make the following homogeneity assumption.
(A.8) For j ∈ J , for k ∈ K, for (a¯, p¯) ∈ A×∆LN , we assume that for all γ > 0,
pij(yj; a¯, γp¯) = γp¯+ γHjs(a¯, p¯)(yj − y¯j), s ∈ S, yj ∈ RLN(y¯j, s),
pik(yk; a¯, γp¯) = γp¯+ γHks(a¯, p¯)(yk − y¯k), s ∈ S, yk ∈ RLN(y¯k, s).
Now we have the following result.
Theorem 6.3 For the economy E defined by (a)-(d), under assumptions A.1, A.2, A.3”,
A.4’, A.5’, A.6, A.7’, and A.8, given any r ∈ RN+ , there exists a Keynes-Negishi equilib-
rium. Moreover, if (p, r, (xh)h∈H, (yj)j∈J , (yk)k∈K) is a Keynes-Negishi equilibrium, then so
is (γp, r, (xh)h∈H, (yj)j∈J , (yk)k∈K) for any γ > 0.
Proof: See Appendix.
Remark Theorem 6.3 establishes existence of equilibria, indeterminacy of the overall price
level, and neutrality of the overall price level, since the real part of equilibria is unaffected
by the overall price level. We return to the interpretation of this dichotomy in Section 7.2.2.
But we must report here and now that DP (Proposition 2) prove a much stronger indeter-
minacy result: “Let St, the set of possible date events at time t, contain Nt elements; for
(c1, . . . , cNt) ∈ RNt++, otherwise arbitrary, there exists a Keynes-Negishi equilibrium with∑
l p˜lst = cst , all st ∈ St.” The meaning of this result is that not only the overall price level
but also the variability of inflation rates are indeterminate; and today’s price level cannot
be inferred from yesterday’s price level and rate of interest. Subject to formal verification,
the same property should hold in the present model.
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7 Discussion
7.1 Assessment
Theorem 6.3 accomplishes precisely the purpose stated at the outset of Section 1.2. Good.
That carries two implications: (i) it shows that Negishi’s approach to Keynesian economics
is coherent, not only in aggregated yet simplified models amenable to explicit solutions,
but also in models and under assumptions of substantial generality; (ii) it shows how kinky
perceived demands can be fitted into general equilibrium theory (GET), thereby opening
the way to incorporation of that feature into more sophisticated and more realistic models
- like general equilibrium with incomplete markets (GEI) or temporary general equilibrium
(TGE).
Ad (ii), it should be noted that more sophisticated models are needed to account
endogenously for two features taken for granted in this paper, namely imperfect competition
on both product and labor markets. Examples of primitive sources of imperfect competition
include: for product markets, the presence of fixed costs or increasing returns to scale (see
Section 5 of DDS); for labor markets, the role of wage rigidities in improving risk sharing
under incomplete markets (see Dre`ze and Gollier (1993) and Herings and Polemarchakis
(2005)). GET with such features is possible, but demanding.
But how far does Theorem 6.3 take us along the program of Negishi’s book entitled
Microeconomic Foundations of Keynesian Macroeconomics? In particular, does this paper
conform to the methodological options advocated by Negishi? Does it lead to applications
(meaning macroeconomic applications), as advocated in the citation up front?
7.2 Methodology
Regarding methodology, three remarks are in order.
7.2.1
Negishi (1979) insists that the economics of Walras are unsuited to provide foundations
for a theory of prolonged unemployment, because: (i) Walras proceeds stepwise from a
real equilibrium, supposed attained through taˆtonnement, to the same equilibrium with
monetary exchange - thus assigning to money an ancillary role relative to real equilibrium;
(ii) price setting agents are needed to make sense of the price rigidities causing prolonged
unemployment.27
The present paper also proceeds stepwise from a real equilibrium to a monetary equilib-
rium. It should however be clear from Theorem 6.3 that the order of presentation, guided
27See Chapter 2 of Negishi (1979).
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by pedagogical considerations, is immaterial: the theorem brings the real and monetary
aspects together (without “order”) into an integrated model, for which existence of equi-
librium is proved. But an existence theorem is silent about the process through which
equilibrium is reached. Existence theory alone does not preempt a particular adjustment
process. Such is the case for any equilibrium concept - whether, for instance, competitive
or Keynesian.
7.2.2
The fact that the overall price level is indeterminate and neutral under Theorem 6.3 does
not result from the order of presentation, but from the modeling assumptions for the
monetary economy, in particular the absence of initial nominal positions or constraints.28
And yet, there is no doubt that the main determinant of today’s price level is yesterday’s
price level!
In order to generate realistic substantive implications, monetary theory must encompass
the dynamics of nominal price formation. In particular, nominal stickiness is required to
allow nominal interest rates set by monetary authorities to affect real rates perceived by
the agents. The fact that a model of transaction demand for money (like CIA) leaves
both the overall price level and the variability (across successor date events) of inflation
rates undetermined is ultimately a saving grace: it leaves room for the specification, and
working, of short-run nominal dynamics! But these are not part of the existence theory
presented here.
One of the merits of introducing kinky demand perceptions is definitely to open the way
to interesting short-run nominal dynamics with price stickiness - interesting, because the
price stickiness is not imposed from outside but rooted in natural information asymmetries;
interesting also because the price dynamics under kinky demands could be varied: whether
or not the location of the kink adjusts to input prices, for instance, can make a lot of
difference!
7.2.3
Pricing rules may seem like a promising concept to model nominal price formation. For
instance, it was noted above that a competitive firm might be modeled as setting prices
equal to marginal costs, thus by-passing the difficulty raised in Arrow (1959). Yet, it should
be recognized that the pricing rules introduced above are first and foremost a tool of the
economist eager to verify the “consistency of a theoretical structure” through an existence
theorem. The actual price setting behavior of a firm holding asymmetrical perceptions
28We note in passing that the levels of nominal interest rates are not neutral; see Corollary 3 in DP.
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of its demand elasticities is apt to be more streamlined than suggested by formula (5.5);
this is especially the case for unions! But it is also apt to be more complex - for instance
reflecting costs of changing prices or adoption of a periodical pattern of staggered price
adjustments. Once again, there is a long way from existence theorems to the dynamics of
short-run adjustment.
7.3 Applications
The main application pursued in Negishi (1979) concerns the role of aggregate demand in
determining the levels of output and employment. Under a sufficiently widespread degree
of price rigidity due to kinky demand perceptions, the economy should react to shocks in
aggregate demand through quantity adjustments at unchanged prices. Attributing such
shocks to whimsical shifts in expectations affecting investment demand but not savings
delivers the Keynesian conclusions.
The framework of this paper is the abstract and essentially static “complete markets”
model of GET, incorporating Walras law and Say’s law. Thus, it does not assign a role to
“aggregate demand;” and it is ill-suited to study “whimsical shifts in expectations.” The
more realistic TGE model would be better suited for that purpose. As noted under (ii) in
Section 7.1, one potential by-product of this paper is to open the way towards analysis of
TGE models with kinky perceived demand.
Still, fitting shifts in expectations into the GET model is possible, if the event tree
is expanded to incorporate unobserved events affecting the expectations of (some) agents,
hence their market demands. (In an expected-utility formulation, the shifts in expectations
operate on subjective probabilities, at unchanged consumption preferences or production
possibilities given date events.)
The question then arises: can one establish, for our general model, that expectations-
induced changes in aggregate (investment) demand result in quantity adjustments at un-
changed prices - at least within a range? In comparison with the simple aggregated models
used in macroeconomics, and in N79, our model is more versatile, which is both a drawback
and a merit. In particular, we have allowed for an arbitrary mix of perfectly or imperfectly
competitive firms and labor markets; also for an arbitrary mix of kinky or smooth perceived
demands. We would thus expect mixed reactions in terms of prices and quantities.
A suggestive analogy comes from the study of economies where some prices are fixed
(group I) and others are flexible (group II); see, in particular, Herings (1996), Dre`ze (1997)
and Citanna et al. (2001), or Dre`ze (2001) for a non-technical summary. The main result
from that literature is this: given arbitrarily fixed group I prices, there exists a continuum
of supply-contrained equilibria (i.e. equilibria with quantity constraints on the supply of
group I commodities), which can be indexed either monotonically by the severity of supply
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rationing, or by the ratio of group II prices (say, their sum) to group I prices.
Borrowing that result, one could state the following about the model studied above.
Call “group I” the set of markets on which prices are set by firms or unions entertaining
kinky demand perceptions.
Conjecture 7.1 With almost every29 Keynes-Negishi equilibrium, one can associate a
continuum of other Keynes-Negishi equilibria with the same group I prices but different
group I quantities.
This conjecture, if correct, would come a long way towards delivering the very application
pursued in Negishi (1979), if one thinks about selection of an element from the continuum
as triggered by an aggregate demand shock. The same conjecture would also come a
long way toward establishing a dual proposition: exogenous shocks affecting the prices of
group II commodities (an oil shock?) could result in quantity adjustments at unchanged
prices for group I commodities.
This dual proposition assumes that the location of the kinks does not move with group II
prices; as remarked in Subsubsection 7.2.2, there are alternative possibilities.
Although aggregate demand shocks provide a privileged application of GET with de-
mand kinks, some others come to mind. Again the analogy with fixed prices is instruc-
tive, as models with price rigidities have proved instructive to study such issues as public
sector pricing (Dre`ze 1984) or the stability of taˆtonnement (Dre`ze 1999) as well as non-
taˆtonnement (Dre`ze 1991) processes. “To tell the story of Keynes-Negishi equilibrium,
therefore, one must talk of its applications as well as of its pure theory.”
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3.2: Let s− denote the sign vector with all components −1, and s+
the sign vector with all components +1. Consider an arbitrary sign vector s ∈ S. When
yj belongs to
RL(y¯j, s) ∩ RL(y¯j, s−) = {y ∈ RL(y¯j, s−) | yl = y¯jl when sl = +1},
then Hjs(a¯, p¯)(yj − y¯j) and Hj−(a¯, p¯)(yj − y¯j) should coincide. It then follows that
Hjs·l (a¯, p¯) = H
j−
·l (a¯, p¯) if sl = −1.
From the fact that Hjs(a¯, p¯)(yj − y¯j) and Hj+(a¯, p¯)(yj − y¯j) should coincide for yj ∈
RL(y¯j, s) ∩ RL(y¯j, s+), we derive that Hjs·l (a¯, p¯) = Hj+·l (a¯, p¯) if sl = +1. Q.E.D.
29Almost every: more precisely, all equilibria with group I prices in the relative interior of the relevant
pricing rules.
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Proof of Lemma 3.3: The production plan y¯j maximizes profits given market data
(a¯, p¯) if and only if for every s ∈ S, y¯j maximizes profits on Y¯ js := Y j ∩RL(y¯j, s). Similar
to (2.2), first-order conditions (FOC) for maximal profits at y¯j on Y¯ js require the existence
of a vector q¯js in N j
Y¯ js
(y¯j), the normal cone to Y¯ js at y¯j, such that
p¯+Hjs(a¯, p¯)>y¯j = q¯js.
Since N j
Y¯ js
(y¯j) = N j(y¯j)− RL(0, s), the result follows. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3.4: To show that (3.3)–(3.4) are sufficient, define, for s ∈ S, qjs = qj
and µjs by
µjsl =
{
qjl −Hj−·l (a¯, p¯)>y¯j − pjl ≤ 0, if sl = −1,
qjl −Hj+·l (a¯, p¯)>y¯j − pjl ≥ 0, if sl = +1.
Then qjs, now independent of s, and µjs fulfill the necessary and sufficient conditions of
Lemma 3.2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3.5: We start with a proof of P.2. Consider first the case where
1 + ι>H
j
(yj; a, p)>yj ≥ 0.
Then, q¯j max(0, 1 + ι>H¯j(yj; a¯, p¯)>yj) equals a non-negative multiple of q¯j, so belongs to
N j(yj), and pj satisfies (3.3) and (3.4) with yj replaced by yj, so yj maximizes profits for
an inverse demand function given by
Hjs(yj; a, p)(y˜j − yj) + pj, s ∈ S, y˜j ∈ RL(yj, s).
In particular pj
>
yj ≥ 0, since the firm can achieve zero profits by remaining inactive.
The second case is where
1 + ι>H
j
(yj; a, p)>yj < 0.
Then (−ι>Hj(yj; a, p)>yj)pj satisfies (3.3) and (3.4) with y¯j replaced by yj and qj equal
to the zero-vector, an element of N j(yj), so by the same reasoning as before,
(−ι>Hj(yj; a, p)>yj)pj>yj ≥ 0.
Since −ι>Hj(yj; a, p)>yj > 1, it follows that pj>yj ≥ 0, as desired.
Now we turn to the proof of P.1. Where unnecessary, we omit the superscript j and
the reference to (a¯, p¯).
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The proof is a tedious sequence of elementary steps, mostly relying on properties of
upper hemi-continuous correspondences as collected in Hildenbrand (1974, pp. 21–26) -
hereafter “H74.” To structure the proof, we introduce the following definitions and notation:
N¯ j : ∂Y j → ∆, N¯ j(yj) := N j(yj) ∩∆;
ωj− : ∂Y j × A×∆×∆→ S,
ωj−(yj, a¯, p¯, q¯j) := {pj ∈ S |
q¯j max(0, 1 + ι>H¯j(yj; a¯, p¯)>yj)− H
j−(yj; a¯, p¯)>yj
max(1,−ι>H¯j(yj; a¯, p¯)>yj) ≤ p
j};
ωj+ : ∂Y j × A×∆×∆→ S,
ωj+(yj, a¯, p¯, q¯j) := {pj ∈ S |
pj ≤ q¯j max(0, 1 + ι>H¯j(yj; a¯, p¯)>yj)− H
j+(yj; a¯, p¯)>yj
max(1,−ι>H¯j(yj; a¯, p¯)>yj)};
ωj : ∂Y j × A×∆×∆→ S,
ωj(yj, a¯, p¯, q¯j) = ωj−(yj, a¯, p¯, q¯j) ∩ ωj+(yj, a¯, p¯, q¯j);
ϕj : ∂Y j × A×∆→ S,
ϕj = ωj ◦ (I × N¯ j),
ϕj(yj; a¯, p¯) = {pj ∈ RL | ∃q¯j ∈ N¯ j(yj) : pj ∈ ωj(yj, a¯, p¯, q¯j)},
where the symbol ◦ stands for composition of correspondences and I : ∂Y j × A × ∆ →
∂Y j × A×∆ denotes the identity.
We must show that ϕj is non-empty, convex, and compact valued and upper hemi-
continuous with respect to (yj, a¯, p¯) over compact sets in ∂Y j × A × ∆; namely, that ϕj
satisfies P.1.
The proof is constructed “bottom-up,” starting with properties of N¯(y), then turning
to ω− and ω+, next to ω; the final step, concerning ϕ, is then in sight.
Step 1
The set N(y) is a closed convex cone of RL+ with vertex 0. Indeed, under free disposal
(Y j + RL− ⊂ Y j) and 0 ∈ Y j, q ∈ N(y) implies q ∈ RL+. Also, N is closed. So, N¯ is
non-empty, convex, and compact valued, and closed.
Step 2
Regarding ω−(y, a¯, p¯, q¯), three cases must be distinguished, according as 1+ ι>H¯(y; a¯, p¯)>y
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is positive (Step 2.1), negative (Step 2.2), or zero (Step 2.3). In all cases, for y and a¯
in a closed cube of RL with finite length and for p¯ ∈ ∆, Assumption A.3’ implies that
H−(y; a¯, p¯) and H+(y; a¯, p¯) are continuous in (y, a¯, p¯) and bounded.
Step 2.1
Let ω−(y, a¯, p¯, q¯) = {p ∈ RL | q¯max(0, 1 + ι>H¯(y; a¯, p¯)y)> − H−(y; a¯, p¯)>y ≤ p}, with
1 + ι>H¯(·)>y > 0 and with q¯ = q¯(y) ∈ N¯(y), a convex, compact set; then ω−(·) is non-
empty, convex, and closed valued. For y and a¯ in a closed cube of RL with finite length,
ω− is bounded from below.
Step 2.2
Let instead ω−(y, a¯, p¯, q¯) = {p ∈ RL | −H−(y;a¯,p¯)>y−ι>H¯(y;a¯,p¯)>y ≤ p}; then ω− is non-empty, convex,
and closed valued; for y and a¯ in a closed cube of RL with finite length, ω− is bounded
from below.
Step 2.3
At 1 + ι>H¯(y; a¯, p¯)>y = 0, the sets of admissible values of p obtained in Step 2.1 and
Step 2.2 are identical, and ω− is closed.
Step 3
The reasoning in Step 2 applies unchanged to ω+(y, a¯, p¯, q¯), except that this time ω+ is
bounded from above.
Using coordinate-wise the lower of the two bounds in Step 2.1 and Step 2.2, we may
write p ≥ p−, whenever p belongs to ω−(y, a¯, p¯, q¯) for (y, a¯) in a closed cube of RL with
finite length; similarly, p ≤ p¯+, whenever p belongs to ω+(y, a¯, p¯, q¯) for (y, a¯) in a closed
cube of RL with finite length. And we have noted in Section 3.1 that the intersection of
ω−(·) and ω+(·) (i.e., ω(·)) is non-empty. So, we may define:
ω¯−(y, a¯, p¯, q¯) := {p ∈ RL | p ∈ ω−(y, a¯, p¯, q¯), p ≤ p¯+},
ω¯+(y, a¯, p¯, q¯) := {p ∈ RL | p ∈ ω+(y, a¯, p¯, q¯), p ≥ p−}.
These correspondences are now compact valued. It follows that ω¯− and ω¯+ are upper
hemi-continuous, and so is their intersection ω(y, a¯, p¯, q¯) - see Proposition 2, p. 23 of H74.
Furthermore, it is immediate that ω is non-empty, convex, and compact valued.
Step 4
We turn now to ϕ. As a composition of two upper hemi-continuous correspondences, ϕ is
itself upper hemi-continuous (H74 corollary on p. 22). Also, it is non-empty and compact
valued, because ω is non-empty and compact valued for all q¯ ∈ N¯(y) and N¯(y) is itself
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non-empty and compact valued. It is convex valued, because N¯(y) is convex valued and q¯
enters linearly in ω¯− and ω¯+, hence in ω. So ϕ is non-empty, convex, and compact valued,
and upper hemi-continuous It satisfies P.1 and P.2, for (y¯, a¯, p¯) in compact sets. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 4.3: Suppose that there exist y˜k and associated p˜ = pik(y˜k; a¯, p¯) and
(x˜h)h∈Hk satisfying (4.6)–(4.8). We define dyk = y˜k − y¯k, dp = p˜ − p¯, and dxh = x˜h − x¯h,
h ∈ Hk. Then (4.8) implies λ¯h>dxh > 0 for all h ∈ Hk, with
dxhk =
dσhk
dykk
dykk
as per (4.7); thus:
kp¯>dkxh + λ¯hk
> dσhk
dykk
dykk > 0, ∀h ∈ Hk,
so ∑
h∈Hk
kp¯>dkxh + λ¯hk
> dσhk
dykk
dykk > 0. (A.1)
It holds that∑
h∈Hk
kp¯>dkxh ≤
∑
h∈Hk
(kp¯>kx˜h − kp˜>kx˜h + p¯k>x¯hk − p˜k>x˜hk)
=
∑
h∈Hk
(−p¯k>dxhk − dpk>x˜hk)
= p¯k
>
dykk + y˜kk
>
dpk
= p¯k
>
dykk + y¯kk
> dpikk
dykk
dykk + dykk
dpikk
dykk
dykk
≤
[
p¯k
>
+ y¯kk
> dpikk
dykk
]
dykk, (A.2)
where the first inequality uses (4.6) and the last inequality the assumption that Hks, s ∈ S,
is NSD. Combining (A.1) and (A.2) results in[
p¯k
>
+ y¯kk
> dpikk
dykk
+
∑
h∈Hk
λ¯hk
> dσhk
dykk
]
dykk > 0. (A.3)
There is l ∈ Lk such that (p¯kl + y¯kk> dpi
k
·l
dykk
+
∑
h∈Hk λ¯
hk> dσhl
dykl
)dykl > 0. For dy
k
l > 0,
implying y¯kl < yˆ
k
l , (A.3) implies
p¯kl >
∑
h
−λ¯hk> dσ
h
l
dykl
−Hkk+·l (a¯, p¯)>y¯kk,
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contradicting the right-hand side inequality in (4.9). For dykl < 0, implying y¯
k
l > 0, (A.3)
implies
p¯kl <
∑
h
−λ¯hk> dσ
h
l
dykl
−Hkk−·l (a¯, p¯)>y¯kk,
contradicting the left-hand side inequality in (4.9). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5.2: The first statement of the lemma follows in the same way as in
Section 3.
We show next that every pj satisfying (5.5) yields pj
>
R+(yj)yj ≥ 0. Consider first the
case where
µj(yj; a, p) ≤ 1.
Then, max(0, 1− µj(yj; a¯, p¯))q¯j equals a non-negative multiple of q¯j, so belongs to N j(yj),
and pj satisfies the sufficient conditions (5.3) and (5.4) with yj replaced by yj, so yj
maximizes profits for an inverse demand function given by
Hjs(yj; a, p)(y˜j − yj) + pj, s ∈ S, y˜j ∈ RLN(yj, s).
In particular pj
>
R+(yj)yj ≥ 0, since the firm can achieve zero profits by remaining inactive.
The second case is where
µj(yj; a¯, p¯) > 1.
Then µj(yj; a¯, p¯)pj satisfies the adjusted sufficient conditions (5.3) and (5.4) with y¯j re-
placed by yj and qj equal to the zero-vector, an element of N j(yj), so by the same reasoning
as before,
µj(yj; a¯, p¯)pj
>
R+(yj)yj ≥ 0.
Since µj(yj; a¯, p¯) > 1, it follows that pj
>
R+(yj)yj ≥ 0, as desired. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 6.2:30 Given some r ∈ RN+ , we want to show existence of a tuple
(p, r, (xh)h∈H, (yj)j∈J , (yk)k∈K) satisfying the properties stated in Definition 6.1.
The boundedness of the set A allows us to replace consumption setsXh by X¯h = Xh∩C,
where C is a closed cube in RLN with length c centered at the origin. The cube C is such
that a ∈ A implies, for every h ∈ H, xh in the interior of C, and for every j ∈ J , yj in
30The logical structure of this step is parallel to that of the proof of Theorem 2 in Dehez and Dre`ze
(1988).
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the interior of C. We define the relevant part of the production set by Y¯ j = {yj ∈ ∂Y j |
yj + cι ∈ RLN+ }. For j ∈ J , we define the homeomorphism gj between ∆LN and Y¯ j as
follows. For yj ∈ Y¯ j,
gj
−1
(yj) =
yj + cι∑
lst∈L×N (y
j
lst
+ c)
:= αj.
Then gj
−1
(yj) 0 if and only if yj + cι 0.
For j ∈ J , the set
{pj ∈ SLN | ∃yj ∈ Y¯ j, ∃a ∈ A, ∃p ∈ ∆LN such that pj ∈ ϕj(yj; a, p)}
is bounded, so it is contained in a compact, convex set Sj.
For k ∈ K, let ϕ˜k(yk; a, p) be defined as the subset of ϕk(yk; a, p) as defined in (5.11)
that satisfies the lower bound on pklst for lst ∈ Lk × N such that yklst = 0, and the upper
bound on pklst for lst ∈ Lk ×N such that yklst = yˆklst . The set
{pk ∈ RLN | ∃yk ∈ Y¯ k, ∃a ∈ A, ∃p ∈ ∆LN such that pk ∈ ϕ˜k(yk; a, p)}
is bounded, so it is contained in a compact, convex set Sk.
We define the correspondence, whose fixed points are equilibria, Φ from ∆LN×∏j∈J Sj×∏
k∈K S
k ×∆JLN ×∏k Y k ×∏h X¯h into itself by:
Φ(p, pJ , pK, α, yK, x) = µ(x, α)×∏j ϕ¯j(p, α, x)×∏k ϕ¯k(p, α, yk, x)
×∏j βj(p, pj, αj)×∏k βk(p, pk, yk)×∏h ξh(p, α, yK, x).
Here, market prices are determined through the market price correspondence µ :
∏
h X¯
h×
∆JLN → ∆LN defined by
µ(x, α) = arg max
p∈∆LN
p>(
∑
h∈H
xh −
∑
h∈H
eh −
∑
j∈J
gj(αj)).
The prices of firm j are determined through the correspondence ϕ¯j : ∆LN × ∆JLN ×∏
h X¯
h → Sj defined by
ϕ¯j(p, α, x) = ϕj(gj(αj); ρ(x, (gj(αj))j∈J , p),
where ϕj is defined in (5.5) and ρ is the projection on A.
The prices of union k are determined through the correspondence ϕ¯k : ∆LN ×∆JLN ×
Y k ×∏h X¯h → Sk defined by
ϕ¯k(p, α, yk, x) = ϕ˜k(yk; ρ(x, (gj(αj))j∈J , p).
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The quantity adjustment correspondence of firm j is a function βj : ∆LN×Sj×∆LN → ∆LN
defined by
βjl′s′
t′
(p, pj, αj) = max{0, αjl′s′
t′
+pl′s′
t′
−pjl′s′
t′
}/
∑
lst
max{0, αjlst+plst−pjlst}, l′s′t′ ∈ L×N .
The quantity adjustment correspondence of union k is a function βk : ∆LN×Sk×Y k → Y k
defined by
βklst(p, p
k, yk) = min{max{0, yklst + plst − pklst}, yˆklst}, lst ∈ Lk ×N ,
βklst(p, p
k, yk) = 0, lst ∈ (L ×N ) \ (Lk ×N ).
The demand correspondence of household h, ξh : ∆LN ×∆JLN ×∏k Y k×∏h X¯h → X¯h
is defined as follows using a technique introduced in Greenberg (1977). Given (p, α, yK, x),
define the modified budget set γh(p, α, yK, x) by
γh(p, α, yK, x) = {x¯h ∈ X¯h | p>R◦(z¯h)z¯h ≤ max{0,∑j∈J θhj vˆj + θhbvˆb},
x¯hk = σhk(yk) if h ∈ Hk},
where vˆj = p>R+(gj(αj))gj(αj), j ∈ J , and vˆb =∑h∈H p>(I − R◦(zh))zh +∑j∈J p>(I −
R+(gj(αj)))gj(αj). Since out of equilibrium the sum of the dividends can be negative, we
use the modified budget set, and replace a negative sum of dividends by zero. If (p, α, yK, x)
is such that there is x¯h ∈ γh(p, α, yK, x) with p>R◦(z¯h)z¯h < max{0,∑j∈J θhj vˆj + θhbvˆb},
then ξh(p, α, yK, x) is defined as the set of h-maximizers on γh(p, α, yK, x). Otherwise,
we define ξh(p, α, yK, x) = γh(p, α, yK, x). These definitions lead to upper hemi-continuous
correspondences ξh.
The correspondence Φ satisfies the assumptions of Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, so
has a fixed point (p¯, p¯J , p¯K, α¯, y¯K, x¯) inducing production bundles gj(α¯j) for a firm j ∈ J
and total excess demand
ζ¯ =
∑
h∈H
x¯h −
∑
h∈H
eh −
∑
j∈J
gj(α¯j).
Clearly, gj(α¯j) ∈ ∂Y j, j ∈ J , and the following conditions are satisfied:
p>ζ¯ ≤ p¯>ζ¯ , p ∈ ∆LN , (A.4)
p¯j ∈ ϕ¯j(p¯, α¯, x¯), j ∈ J , (A.5)
p¯k ∈ ϕ¯k(p¯, α¯, y¯k, x¯), k ∈ K, (A.6)
α¯j = βj(p¯, p¯j, α¯j), j ∈ J , (A.7)
y¯k = βk(p¯, p¯k, y¯k), k ∈ K, (A.8)
x¯h ∈ ξh(p¯, α¯, y¯K, x¯), h ∈ H.
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For j ∈ J , we define β¯j =∑lst∈L×N max{0, α¯jlst + p¯lst − p¯jlst}. Then, (A.7) implies
β¯jα¯jlst ≥ α¯jlst + p¯lst − p¯jlst , j ∈ J , (A.9)
with equality whenever α¯jlst > 0. Multiplying both sides of (A.9) by R
+
lst,lst
(gj(α¯j))α¯jlst and
summing over all lst, we get
(β¯j − 1)α¯j>R+(gj(α¯j))α¯j = (p¯− p¯j)>R+(gj(α¯j))α¯j,
where β¯j ≥ 1 and α¯j>R+(gj(α¯j))α¯j ≥ 0. We therefore obtain that
(p¯− p¯j)>R+(gj(α¯j))α¯j ≥ 0 for all j ∈ J . (A.10)
By definition of gj, there exists µ > 0 and ν > 0 such that
gj(α¯j) = µα¯j − νι.
We then have
(p¯− p¯j)>R+(gj(α¯j))gj(α¯j) = (p¯− p¯j)>R+(gj(α¯j))µα¯j − (p¯− p¯j)>R+(gj(α¯j))νι.
This expression is non-negative, since the first term is non-negative by (A.10) and the
term subtracted is non-positive, since gjlst(α¯
j) > 0 implies α¯jlst > 0, so by (A.7), 0 ≤
(β¯j − 1)α¯jlst = p¯lst − p¯jlst and
(p¯− p¯j)>R+(gj(α¯j))ι =
∑
lst|gjlst (α¯j)>0
R+lst,lst(g
j(α¯j))(p¯− p¯jlst) +
∑
lst|gjlst (α¯j)≤0
R+lst,lst(g
j(α¯j))(p¯− p¯jlst)
=
∑
lst|gjlst (α¯j)>0
R+lst,lst(g
j(α¯j))(p¯− p¯jlst) +
∑
lst|gjlst (α¯j)≤0
(p¯− p¯jlst)
≤
∑
lst∈L×N
(p¯lst − p¯jlst) = 0.
We have shown that
p¯>R+(gj(α¯j))gj(α¯j) ≥ p¯j>R+(gj(α¯j))gj(α¯j), j ∈ J .
By (A.5), p¯j ∈ ϕj(gj(α¯j); ρ(x¯, (gj(α¯j))j∈J , p¯), so p¯j>R+(gj(α¯j))gj(α¯j) ≥ 0 and therefore
p¯>R+(gj(α¯j))gj(α¯j) ≥ 0 for j ∈ J . (A.11)
By (A.11), dividend income is non-negative for every household, so the usual budget con-
straints apply. Summing over all budget constraints we get
p¯>(
∑
h∈H
x¯h −
∑
h∈H
eh −
∑
j∈J
gj(α¯j)) ≤ 0,
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which, combined with (A.4), yields∑
h∈H
x¯h −
∑
h∈H
eh −
∑
j∈J
gj(α¯j) ≤ 0,
The fixed point therefore defines a feasible allocation. It now follows that ρ(x¯, (gj(α¯j))j∈J ) =
(x¯, (gj(α¯j))j∈J ), so by (A.5) and (A.6),
p¯j ∈ ϕj(gj(α¯j); (x¯, (gj′(α¯j′))j′∈J , p¯), j ∈ J ,
p¯k ∈ ϕ˜k(y¯k; (x¯, (gj(α¯j))j∈J )), p¯), k ∈ K. (A.12)
It also follows that α¯j  0 for all j ∈ J , so by (A.7), p¯j = p¯ for all j ∈ J , so we have
shown that
p¯ ∈ ϕj(gj(α¯j); (x¯, (gj′(α¯j′))j′∈J , p¯), j ∈ J ,
Equation (A.8) implies, for lst ∈ Lk ×N ,
y¯klst ≤ y¯klst + p¯lst − p¯klst if y¯klst = yˆklst ,
y¯klst = y¯
k
lst + p¯lst − p¯klst if 0 < y¯klst < yˆklst ,
y¯klst ≥ y¯klst + p¯lst − p¯klst if y¯klst = 0,
whereas y¯klst = 0 for lst ∈ (L ×N ) \ (Lk ×N ). It follows that
(p¯− p¯k)>y¯k ≥ 0, for all k ∈ K,
so, for lst ∈ Lk ×N , p¯klst ≤ p¯lst if y¯klst = yˆklst , p¯klst = p¯lst if 0 < y¯klst < yˆklst , and p¯klst ≥ p¯lst if
y¯klst = 0. These inequalities combined with (A.12) imply
p¯ ∈ ϕk(y¯k; (x¯, (gj(α¯j))j∈J , p¯), k ∈ K.
Suppose there is lst such that p¯lst = 0. Let l
′s′t′ be such that p¯l′s′t′ > 0. Let h
′ be a
household whose supply of l′s′t′ is not under the control of a union. Our assumptions
on primitives guarantee that there is xˆh
′ ∈ γh′(p¯, α¯, y¯K, x¯) with p¯>R◦(zˆh′)zˆh′ < 0 ≤∑
j∈J θ
h′j vˆj + θhbvˆb, where vˆj = p¯>R+(gj(α¯j))gj(α¯j), j ∈ J , and vˆb = ∑h∈H p¯>(I −
R◦(z¯h))z¯h +
∑
j∈J p¯
>(I − R+(gj(α¯j)))gj(α¯j). It follows that ξh′(p¯, α¯, y¯K, x¯) is the set of
h′-maximizers on γh′(p¯, α¯, y¯K, x¯). Since preferences of h′ are strictly monotonic with re-
spect to xh
′
lst
, it holds that x¯h
′
lst
= c, which contradicts that the fixed point defines a feasible
allocation. Prices p¯ are therefore strictly positive, all households can be shown to maximize
their preferences, and∑
h∈H
x¯h −
∑
h∈H
eh −
∑
j∈J
gj(α¯j) = 0.
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Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 6.3: Going from the case of Theorem 6.2 with ι>p¯ = 1 to the case
of Theorem 6.3 with ι>p¯ = γ for arbitrary γ > 0 is a small step: just multiply all prices,
vectors q¯j, q¯k and matrices Hj−(·), Hj+(·), H¯j(·), Hk−(·), Hk+(·), H¯k(·) by γ and note
that all the conditions in the definition of a Keynes-Negishi equilibrium remain satisfied.
Indeed:
Ad (i): The budget sets are invariant with respect to γ; hence, xh is h-maximal on the
redefined feasible set.
Ad (ii): The profits are homogeneous of degree 1 in γ because of Assumptions A.8; hence,
yj maximizes profits on Y j independent of the choice of γ.
Ad (iii): Assumption A.8 implies that the set of consumption bundles attainable for union
members after redistribution is unaffected by γ; hence, yk is Pareto efficient for Hk inde-
pendent of the choice of γ.
Ad (iv): Obvious. Q.E.D.
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